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INTRODUCTION
HJISTORICALLY, purchasers of goods at foreclosure sales gener-
ally have done so at their own peril.' The purchaser assumed the
risk that good title would not be conveyed through the sale due to a
defect in the title or as a result of the seller's wrongful acts.2 Unlike
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Student Affairs, Widener Univer-
sity School of Law. J.D., University of Louisville; LL.M. Temple University. The
Author wishes to thank John Gedid and Russell Hakes for comments and suggestions
made on earlier drafts and during the writing process, and Jesse Pittard, Steven Skoff,
Melissa Schwartz, and Marie Wasilchak for their research assistance.
1. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-312(2) cmt. 5 (1994) (explaining that foreclosing lienor
does not give warranty of title to purchaser); Steve H. Nickles, Rights and Remedies
Between UCC Article 9 Secured Parties with Conflicting Security Interests in Goods, 68
Iowa L. Rev. 217, 254 (1983) (noting that "[b]uyers at forced sales traditionally have
been required to assume the risk that superior encumbrances... [would] survive the
disposition of the property to them").
2. An example of a seller's wrongful act, the risk of which the purchaser as-
sumes, is wrongful repossession and sale. When the debtor is not in default, a secured
2419
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most sales of goods, a party selling goods at a foreclosure sale does
not, in any way, warrant title to the goods.3 Excluding the warranty of
title from foreclosure transactions, however, could have unjust results.
In the event that the foreclosing secured party wrongfully sold the
goods, the purchaser would not obtain good title to the property. Be-
cause the purchaser assumed the risk of a wrongful sale, however, the
seller would be legally entitled to retain the proceeds generated by the
sale.4 This would be true even when the seller's acts were a contribut-
ing factor to the failure of title to pass.
party has no authority to repossess or sell the collateral. U.C.C. §§ 9-501, -504; see
also Martens v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 729 F. Supp. 1391, 1393 (D.D.C. 1990) (stat-
ing that default is condition to repossession and sale of collateral under U.C.C.);
Cynthia Starnes, U.C.C. Section 9-504 Sales by Junior Secured Parties: Is a Senior
Party Entitled to Notice and Proceeds?, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 563, 581 (1991) (same). In
the absence of default, a secured party who repossesses and sells collateral has con-
verted it. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 47 (Okla. 1984)
(stating creditor liable for conversion when creditor repossessed in absence of de-
fault). A purchaser from the secured party receives void title. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v.
Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099, 1103-04 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding that a good
faith purchaser from a converter did not receive good title); Imni-Etti v. Aluisi, 492
A.2d 917, 923 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (same). The debtor has the right to reclaim
the collateral or seek damages from the secured party and the purchaser. See Swift &
Co., 426 F.2d at 1104 (finding that owner could recover goods from possession of
innocent purchaser); Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to
Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 172,
216 (1983) (explaining owner's right to recover damages from innocent purchaser
even if wrongdoer is available to be sued). Even though the purchaser's failure to
receive good title is due in this instance to the wrongful repossession and sale by the
seller, the purchaser is not entitled to recover damages from the seller, under either
the U.C.C. or common law, for breach of the warranty of title or in restitution. See
Robyn L. Meadows, A Potential Pitfall for the Unsuspecting Purchaser of Repossessed
Collateral: The Overlooked Interaction Between Sections 9-504(4) and 2-312(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 167, 195-204 (1994) (explaining that
failure to convey title through foreclosure sale is not basis for recovery for buyer
under either warranty of title or restitution).
3. While U.C.C. § 2-312 generally implies a warranty by the seller of a good that
the seller possesses title to the good and has the power to transfer the good to the
buyer, subsection (2) limits that warranty in certain transactions, including foreclosure
sales. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 5; see also Vend-A-Matic v. Foothill Capital Corp., 37 B.R.
838, 840-41 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (finding no warranty of title attached to secured
creditor's sale of debtor's collateral); Nickels, supra note 1, at 254 (stating that buyers
at forced sale were traditionally required to assume risk that superior encumbrances
would survive disposition of property to them).
4. See, e.g., Dixon v. City Nat'l Bank, 395 N.E.2d 620, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(holding that buyer at judicial sale is not entitled to return of purchase price where
sale was void because buyer bids at own risk), affid, 410 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1980); Hutson
v. Wood, 105 N.E. 343, 348 (111. 1914) (same); England v. Clark, 5 Ill. 487, 490-92
(1843) (finding that caveat emptor applied to execution sales therefore purchaser not
entitled to return of money paid where property sold did not belong to debtor); Di-
versified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 722-23 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a
purchaser at a foreclosure sale was not entitled to damages where the sale was con-
ducted by a lender and the title conveyed is void). But see Basiliko v. Pargo Corp., 532
A.2d 1346, 1348 (D.C. 1987) (finding that "a seller who breaches [a] ... contract for
the sale of real property is liable to the would-be purchaser for compensatory dam-
ages."); Bogestad v. Anderson, 173 N.W. 674, 675 (Minn. 1919) (holding that a pur-
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In a previous article,5 I discussed this issue based on the interaction
between the current provisions in Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (the "U.C.C." or "Code")-addressing the warranty of ti-
tle6-and the provisions in Article 9-regarding foreclosure sales7-
that focuses primarily on the relationship between the debtor and the
purchaser of the collateral. In that article, I proposed that the current
law, that does not provide protection for purchasers at foreclosure
sales from the debtor's claims or the wrongful actions of the selling
secured party, contributed to depressed realization on the sale and,
ultimately, the debt. I further argued that the current law is unjust
and economically inefficient because it fails to balance the interests of
the purchaser and the debtor in the good.
Article 9 is currently under review for possible revision by the
American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL").8 The NCCUSL
Drafting Committee, charged with revising Article 9, has addressed
one aspect of the situation that I discussed in my earlier article. The
current proposal to rectify the inequitable treatment of purchasers at
foreclosure sales is quite simple. To the section governing foreclosure
sales-section 9-504(a)-the Revision proposes to add: "Unless effec-
tively excluded or modified, a contract for sale, lease, license, or other
disposition includes the warranties related to title, possession, quiet
enjoyment, and the like which by operation of law accompany a vol-
untary disposition of property of the kind subject to the contract." 9
While this language seems to solve the problems raised in my ear-
lier article, to wit, extending warranty of title protection to purchasers
at foreclosure sales, this Article will address the significant problems
caused by this simple, yet sweeping language. I contend that this revi-
sion will result in broader protection for purchasers than is needed or
desirable. I further suggest that this change may not solve the
problems caused by the current version of Article 9, but wil in fact
create additional problems which the drafters have not adequately
considered. By failing to balance the relevant interests involved, this
revision to Article 9 will merely substitute one inequity for another. I
chaser may recover the price paid from a foreclosing seller if the seller failed to
convey good title as a result of seller's own conduct).
5. Meadows, supra note 2.
6. U.C.C. § 2-312.
7. In Part 5 of Article 9, the creditor is given the right to repossess and sell collat-
eral subject to a security interest upon the debtor's default. U.C.C. §§ 9-501, -503,
-504.
8. U.C.C. § 9-504 (Proposed Draft 1996) [hereinafter Draft, Article 9]. A more
recent draft of U.C.C. article 9 was available on the World Wide Web at http'//
www.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc9/Mlldraft.htm on March 31, 1997 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review); however, the substance of the new proposal does not affect
this Article. All references to the proposed U.C.C. article 9 are to Draft, Article 9
supra.
9. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504(a).
1997] 2421
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propose that a careful balancing of the parties' interests and the equi-
ties involved will result in a more workable solution than the current
consideration.
I. WARRANTY OF TITLE
Before a thorough analysis of the proposed revision to section 9-504
can be undertaken, it is necessary to consider the warranty of title
under Article 2, which the revision has lifted wholesale into 9-504.
This section will review the history, underlying premises, and extent of
the warranty of title as it has evolved and is currently applied under
the Code.
A. Common Law
The evolution of the warranty of title predated the adoption of the
Code. At early common law, particularly in England, the seller of
personal property did not warrant a good sold, in any respect, even as
to title.' ° This early approach was founded on two basic principles of
law, nemo dat and caveat emptor." The seller could transfer only such
title as it possessed, and the buyer assumed the risk of title defi-
ciency.'" A fair price paid by the buyer did not guarantee that good
title would be transferred.
In the 1800s, the courts in England and the United States gradually
began to erode the harshness of this rule. Initially, courts permitted
buyers to recover for the seller's failure to convey good title if the
seller misrepresented the state of title or concealed title defects.' 3
10. William D. Hawkland & Frederick H. Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Se-
ries § 2-312:01 (1994); Irving Mariash, A Treatise on the Law of Sales § 113 (1930)
(stating that, at early common law, caveat emptor was the rule with respect to title,
and parties were presumed to deal at arm's length); see also Morley v. Attenborough,
3 Ex. 500 (1849) (stating, in dicta, that no warranty of title implied in sale which is
consummated through transfer of specific good).
11. Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:01 (stating lack of warranty of title
in sale in early common law based on nemo dat quod non habet (he who hath not
cannot give) and caveat emptor (buyer beware)). This approach is consistent with
early court's reluctance to interfere in contractual relationships under a laissez faire
approach. See Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Anglo-American Common Law of
Contract 288-95 (1990) (explaining that nineteenth century courts were guided by lais-
sez-faire ideals); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract
and Tort Law with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 568-569 (1982) (noting early courts' refusal to inteiject
terms into private contracts based on freedom of contract); Joseph W. Singer, Legal
Realism Now, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 467, 477-481 (1988) (discussing classical theorists' ap-
proach to freedom of contract in the last century which included the state's refusal to
regulate the terms of agreements between private parties).
12. Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:01.
13. Edmund H. Bennett & Samuel C. Bennett, Benjamin's Treatise on the Law of
Sale of Personal Property § 627, at 583 (6th ed. 1892); 1 Samuel Williston, The Law
Governing Sales of Goods at Common Law and Under the Uniform Sales Act § 217,
at 561 (rev. ed. 1948); see Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500 (1849) (noting while
2422 [Vol. 65
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This recovery was grounded in fraud, not in contract. 4 Courts also
began to recognize an alternative ground for recovery: an express af-
firmation by the seller that the seller was the owner of the good.15
This theory provided recovery under a contractual express warranty. 6
Courts presumed that the parties did not intend for the seller to war-
rant the title to the good unless the seller expressly assumed that obli-
gation, thus courts required an affirmative act or assumption of
liability before the seller would be found to warrant title.'7
The requirement of affirmative conduct on the part of the seller
limited a court's ability to protect buyers who paid full price for a
good that was subject to a third party's claim. Further extension of
the warranty of title would require a court to change its underlying
assumption regarding the parties' intentions and the effect of the par-
ties' silence as to title.18 Consequently, courts first extended the war-
ranty of title by implication to public sales by merchants on the
grounds that the open display of the goods for sale was equivalent to a
representation that the merchant owned the goods. 19 Later, courts ex-
tended the warranty to sales in which the seller had possession of the
good. z0 These courts viewed a sale coupled with the seller's posses-
sion as the equivalent of the seller's representation that the seller had
title.2' Consistent with the trend of extending the warranty, courts
generally sale alone does not give rise to warranty of title, seller's fraud or affirmation
of ownership can amount to warranty).
14. Williston, supra note 13, § 217, at 561.
15. See Starr v. Anderson, 19 Conn. 338 (1848) (holding that joint owner of horse
who sold horse as his own warranted title); Balte v. Bedemiller, 60 P. 601, 602 (Or.
1900) (stating, in dicta, affirmation by seller that seller owns good equivalent to war-
ranty of title); see also Joshua Williams, The Law of Personal Property 399 (7th ed.
1870) (explaining that vendor who states goods are his own warrants title to the
goods); Williston, supra note 13, § 217, at 561 (same).
16. Wlliston, supra note 13, § 217.
17. See Mariash, supra note 10, § 113 (noting that early courts assumed parties
dealt at arm's length and therefore courts did not find warranty of title without
seller's assumption of the obligation); Williston, supra note 13, § 217 (explaining that
courts found no warranty of title unless the seller concealed the fact that he lacked
title or made express affirmation of title).
18. Frank H. Childs, Principles of the Law of Personal Property, § 169, at 202-03
(1914) (explaining implied warranties, including title, arise in the law based on the
presumed intent of the parties).
19. See, e.g., Eichholz v. Bannister, 144 Eng. Rep. 284 (1864) (implying warranty
of title in sale by warehouseman); see also Williams, supra note 15, at 399 (explaining
that by last quarter of nineteenth century, seller of goods in open shop or warehouse
impliedly warranted that seller owned the goods).
20. Williston, supra note 13, § 218; see, e.g., Edwards v. Beard, 100 So. 101, 103
(Ala. 1924) (stating that the law implies warranty of title when the seller is in posses-
sion of the good); Hafer v. Cole, 57 So. 757, 759 (Ala. 1912) (same); Jordan v. Van
Duzee, 165 N.W. 877, 878 (Minn. 1917) (same); Close v. Crossland, 50 N.W. 694
(Minn. 1891) (same).
21. See, e.g., Baker v. McAllister, 3 P. 581 (Wash. 1881) (holding that both the
warranty of good title and against encumbrances is impied in the sale of good in
seller's possession); Burt v. Dewey, 40 N.Y. 283 (1869) (finding that possession by a
seller of a good implies the seller's title to the good); Eiciholz, 144 Eng. Rep. 284
1997] 2423
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took a broad view of possession.'2 Gradually, the requirement of
seller's possession faded away, and courts began to hold that a seller
of personal property impliedly warrants good title and the right to sell
the good.2 3 This rule concerning tangible personal property was ulti-
mately extended to the sales of intangibles.2 4 By the turn of the cen-
tury, the doctrine of warranty of title had evolved from the
presumption that the parties intended no warranty to the diametri-
cally opposite presumption that the parties intended the seller to war-
rant title unless circumstances clearly demonstrated the contrary.25
B. Uniform Sales Act
By the promulgation of the Uniform Sales Act in 1906, the common
law universally recognized the implied warranty of title in the sale of
personal property.26 Just as American common law with respect to
warranty of title evolved from British common law, section 13 of the
Uniform Sales Act was based on the British Sale of Goods Act.2 7 Sec-
(stating that possession by a seller of a good is equivalent to the affirmation that the
seller was the owner of the good).
22. Bennett & Bennett, supra note 13, at 633 (explaining that courts construed
possession broadly to include constructive possession); North Am. Commercial Co. v.
North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 100 P. 985, 986 (Wash. 1909) (holding that the
seller impliedly warranted title to coal that was in seller's constructive possession at
time of sale).
23. See, e.g., American Mach. Co. v. Everedy Mach. Co., 35 F.2d 526, 528 (E.D.
Pa. 1929) (finding that warranty of title exists in every sale of personal property);
Gray v. D.P. Haynes & Bro., 51 So. 416, 417 (Ala. 1909) (holding that in the sale of
chattel, warranty of title is implied); Fulwell v. Brown, 121 N.W. 265 (Mich. 1909)
(explaining that the modem rule in England and the United States is that sale of
personal property implies affirmation by seller that property is his, and therefore,
seller warrants title thereto); Spotless Co. v. Commercial Trust Co., 214 N.Y.S. 10
(App. Div. 1926) (holding that the seller of a good warrants title regardless of
possession).
24. Jeffers v. Easton, Eldridge & Co., 45 P. 680 (Cal. 1896) (stating that the law
views the assignment of a lease as the sale of personalty and thus the warranty of title
is implied even without a written agreement to warrant); Ratcliff v. Paul, 220 P. 279,
280 (Kan. 1923) (same); Tomlinson v. Thurmon, 181 So. 458, 460 (La. 1938) (finding
an implied warranty of title in the sale of a mineral lease); Wood v. Sheldon, 42 N.J.L.
421 (1880) (extending the warranty of title to the sale of scrip dividend); Singer v.
Karron, 294 N.Y.S. 566 (Mun. Ct. 1937) (finding an implied warranty of title in the
sale of information as personal property).
25. Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:01; Williston, supra note 13, § 218;
see, e.g., Motley v. Darling, 98 A. 384 (N.J. 1919) (finding a warranty of title in a sale
in which the buyer paid full price and the circumstances showed that absolute title
was intended to be transferred, and the intent to sell without a warrant was not
proven by seller).
26. U.C.C. § 2-312, official cmt., 1A U.L.A. 88 (1989); Bennett, supra note 13, at
631; Mariash, supra note 10, § 113.
27. Williston, supra note 13, § 216. The Sale of Goods Act, 1893 § 12 provided:
[I]n a contract of sale, unless the circumstances of the contract are such as to
show a different intention, there is:-
(1) "An implied condition on the part of the seller that, in the case of a sale,
he has a right to sell the goods, and that, in the case of an agreement to
2424 [Vol. 65
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tion 13 of the Uniform Sales Act codified and clarified the law regard-
ing warranty of title in the sales of goods.' The warranty of title
under the Uniform Sales Act had three component warranties: right-
ful sale, quiet possession, and against encumbrances. 29 The warranty
of rightful sale insured that the seller had both the power and the right
to sell the good.3" The warranty of quiet possession protected the
buyer's possession and use of the good from interference from lawful
third party claims.3' Lastly, the seller warranted that there was no lien
or other encumbrance on the property except those about which the
buyer had actual knowledge.32 The warranty was implied in most
sales of goods, regardless of whether the seller possessed the goods or
knew of third party claims.33 Notably, the Uniform Sales Act, as the
sell, he will have a right to sell the goods at the time when the property is
to pass:"
(2) "An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet posses-
sion of the goods."
(3) "An implied warranty that the goods shall be free from any charge or
incumbrance in favour of any third party, not declared or known to the
buyer before or at the time when the contract is made."
Harold Potter & A.K. Kiralfy, Goodeve's Modem Law of Personal Property 134 (8th
ed. 1937) (quoting The Sales of Goods Act).
28. The Uniform Sales Act § 13 provided:
In a contract to sell or a sale, unless a contrary intention appears, there is-
(1) An implied warranty on the part of the seller that in the case of a
sale he has a right to sell the goods, and that in the case of a con-
tract to sell he will have a right to sell the goods at the time when
the property is to pass.
(2) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet pos-
session of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the time
of the sale.
(3) An implied warranty that the goods shall be free at the time of the
sale from any charge or incumbrance in favor of any third person,
not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the
contract or sale is made.
(4) This section shall not, however, be held to render liable a sheriff,
auctioneer, mortgagee, or other person professing to sell by virtue
of authority in fact or law goods in which a third person has a legal
or equitable interest.
U.S.A. § 13, reprinted in Williston, supra note 13 § 216, at 560 [hereinafter U.S.A.].
29. IO
30. Id. § 13(1).
31. Id. § 13(2); Martin v. Coffman, 95 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (holding
seller warranted buyer's quiet enjoyment against lawful claims).
32. U.S.A., supra note 28, § 13(3); Olson v. Barnick, 61 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 1953)
(finding that an encumbrance at the time of sale constituted a breach of the seller's
warranty of title); Williston, supra note 13, § 218 (stating that implied warranty of title
means that a seller "has a perfect title free from incumbrances").
33. See, e.g., Spotless Co. v. Commercial Trust Co., 214 N.Y.S. 10 (App. Div. 1926)
(holding seller warrants title to good by implication under Uniform Sales Act regard-
less of possession); Little v. Fittro, 54 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio CL App. 1943) (finding the
seller liable for breach of warranty of title even though the seller honestly but errone-
ously believed that the seller owned goods); Bunch v. D.S. Etheridge Co., 180 S.W.2d
225, 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943) (explaining that seller of automobile under Uniform
Sales Act impliedly warrants title to and quiet possession of good).
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common law had before it, excluded sales by foreclosing mortgagees
from the warranty of title.34
C. Uniform Commercial Code
The policies codified in U.S.A. section 13 were adopted and simpli-
fied by the adoption of the U.C.C. in its warranty of title provision,
section 2-312.35 Under Article 2 of the Code, the warranty of title is
implied in most sales of goods.36 In sales subject to Article 2, the
seller warrants to the buyer that the "title conveyed shall be good, and
[the good's] transfer rightful. '37 The seller also warrants that the good
is "delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encum-
brance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowl-
edge."'38 The warranty of quiet possession was subsumed under the
general warranty of title and became merely one way by which a seller
could breach the Code warranty of title.39 Sellers who are merchants
regarding goods of the kind sold also warrant that the goods are not
subject to a rightful infringement claim of another's intellectual prop-
erty rights.4 °
The law has continued to develop regarding the warranty of title.4'
As with Article 9 of the Code, revisions of Article 2 are also currently
under way. In that revision process, changes have been proposed to
34. U.S.A., supra note 28, § 13(4).
35. Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2:312:01 (explaining that U.C.C. § 2-312
continued policies of Uniform Sales Act § 13 while simplifying language and clarify-
ing requirements for disclaimer of warranty).
36. U.C.C. § 2-312 provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the
seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other
lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting
has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by
specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to
know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is
purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person may
have.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in
goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the
rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or the like but
a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller
harmless against any such claim which arises out of compliance with the
specifications.
U.C.C. § 2-312.
37. Id § 2-312(1)(a).
38. Id. § 2-312(1)(b).
39. Id § 2-312 cmt. 1.
40. Id § 2-312(3).
41. The warranty of title has expanded into the international sales context. The
Convention on the International Sales of Goods provides that the seller is required to
deliver goods "free from any right or claim of a third party" in the absence of an
2426 [Vol. 65
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section 2-312.42 While the parameters of the warranty remain essen-
tially unchanged, the revision makes clear that the title and transfer
must not only be good and rightful, but also uncontested.4 3 The revi-
sion would also extend seller's liability to a remote buyer, eliminating
privity as a defense."
D. Extent of Warranty of Title
When the warranty of title attaches, the seller warrants not only its
own title and conduct, but that of all its predecessors in interest as
agreement to the contrary. United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods Art. 41, reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264, 6270 (1987).
42. The most recent draft of revised U.C.C. § 2-312 provides:
(a) Subject to subsection (b), a contract for sale contains a warranty by a
seller, including an auctioneer or liquidator who fails to disclose its prin-
cipal, that:
(1) the title conveyed is good and uncontested and its transfer is right-
ful and does not unreasonably expose the buyer to a lawsuit; and
(2) the goods will be delivered free from any security interest or other
lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting
does not have knowledge.
(b) A warranty under subsection (a) may be excluded or modified only by
specific language or by circumstances giving the buyer reason to know
that the seller does not claim title or purports to sell only such right or
tile as the seller or a third party may have. Language in a record is
sufficient to exclude warranties under this section if it is conspicuous and
states "There is no warranty of tile or against infringement in this sale,"
or words of similar effect.
(c) Unless otherwise agreed, a seller who deals in goods of the kind sold
warrants that the goods will be delivered free of the rightful claim of a
third party by way of infringement or the like. However, a buyer who
furnishes specifications to the seller holds the seller harmless against any
claim that arises out of compliance with the specifications.
(d) A seller's warranty of tile, made to an immediate buyer, extends to any
remote buyer who may reasonably be expected to buy the goods and
who suffers damage from breach of the warranty. The rights and reme-
dies of a remote buyer against the seller for breach of warranty are de-
termined by the enforceable terms of the contract between the seller
and the immediate buyer and this article.
Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform St. Ls., U.C.C. § 2-312 (Proposed Draft 1996)
(visited May 6, 1996) <httpJ/ www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulc/ucc2/textm96.htm> (on
file with the Fordhwm Law Review) [hereinafter Draft, Article 2]. A more recent
draft of U.C.C. article 2 was available on the World Wide Web at http:/I
www.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/mlldraft.htm on March 31, 1997 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review), however, the substance of the new proposal does not affect
this Article. All references to the proposed U.C.C. article 2 are to Draft, Article 2
supra.
43. Id § 2-312 n.2. ("[S]eller also warrants that the title is uncontested. This pro-
tects the buyer against various 'cloud's on an otherwise good title that affect the value
of the goods.").
44. Id § 2-312(d); see also id n.7 (explaining that, under revised section, privity
will not be a defense against a remote buyer claiming a breach of the warranty of tile,
however, the remote buyer's rights will be limited by the contract between the seller
and its buyer).
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well.45 Intent or knowledge on the part of the seller regarding the
nature of title conveyed is irrelevant.4 6 The warranty is breached un-
less the seller "transfers to his purchaser 'a good, clean title... in a
rightful manner so that [the buyer] will not be exposed to a lawsuit in
order to protect it.' ,,4 The seller's ignorance of the defect is no de-
fense.48 Once the warranty attaches, the seller is strictly liable for any
breach thereof.
A seller breaches the warranty of title when transferring a good re-
ceived from a thief,49 or converter,5 0 or subject to a paramount secur-
45. Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby, 703 F. Supp. 511, 518 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (discuss-
ing refund of purchaser price to buyer from innocent final seller); Marvin v. Connelly,
252 S.E.2d 562 (S.C. 1979) (finding breach of warranty where seller's predecessor in
title had stolen trailer from rightful owner); see Ricklefs v. Clemens, 531 P.2d 94, 100
(Kan. 1975) (finding defendant seller liable for damages for breach of warranty of
title for sale of stolen vehicle although seller was unaware of theft); Riggs Motor Co.
v. Archer, 240 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951) (awarding damages to buyer where
seller unknowingly conveyed a stolen good); James J. White & Robert S. Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-12, at 422 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that to be liable for
breach of warranty of title, "the seller need not be a merchant, and he is not saved by
his own ignorance of the defect in his title"); see also Keller v. Judd, 671 S.W.2d 604
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding innocent seller liable for breach of warranty of title
where seller unknowingly sold stolen automobile).
46. White & Summers, supra note 45, § 9-12, at 422 (explaining that seller's
knowledge of defect resulting in breach of warranty of title is irrelevant); see, e.g.,
Crook, 703 F. Supp. at 518-20 (holding that a seller of stolen truck is not liable for
fraud when a buyer failed to prove that the seller knew that the truck was stolen,
however, the seller is still liable for breach of warranty of title); Brokke v. Williams,
766 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Mont. 1989) (finding pawn broker liable for breach of warranty
of title even though seller did not know that goods sold were stolen); Marvin, 252
S.E.2d at 563 (stating, in dicta, seller "not saved by his own ignorance" in action for
breach of warranty of title (quoting White & Summer, supra note 45, at 299-300));
Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172, 176 (S.D. 1995) (stating neither seller's good faith
nor ignorance of defect constitutes defense to breach of warranty of title).
47. Jefferson v. Jones, 408 A.2d 1036, 1039 (Md. 1979) (quoting Md. Code Ann.
(1975), Commercial Law Act., § 2-312, cmt. 1).
48. See, e.g., Ricklefs, 531 P.2d at 99-100 (finding seller liable for breach of war-
ranty even though seller did not know good sold had been stolen); Riggs Motor Co.,
240 S.W.2d at 76 (same).
49. Lawson v. Turner, 404 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding the
trial court's finding that the seller breached the warranty of title by delivering a truck
that was later determined to be stolen); Shelly Motors, Inc. v. Bortnick, 664 P.2d 755,
757 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming the judgment that an automobile dealer
breached warranty of title when the dealer sold a stolen vehicle to another dealer-
ship); Riggs Motor Co., 240 S.W.2d at 76 (finding that an innocent buyer entitled to
recover damages under warranty of title from an innocent seller of stolen a good);
John St. Auto Wrecking v. Motors Ins. Corp., 288 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (Dist. Ct. 1968)
(holding that the sale of a stolen car by unknowing seller breached the warranty of
title); Marvin, 252 S.E.2d at 563 (holding a seller's failure to convey good title because
seller's interest in trailer derived from a thief as a breach of the warranty of title).
50. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. Dobbs, 743 S.W.2d 348, 355-57 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (permitting buyer of timber to be indemnified under breach of warranty for
timber that was innocently taken from land that was improperly described in timber
lease); see also McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978). In McDonald's Chevrolet, the Indiana Court of Appeals found a breach of the
warranty of title when the goods transferred had originally been wrongfully retained
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ity interest or lien of which the buyer does not have knowledge." The
buyer is protected unless the buyer has actual knowledge of the de-
fect.52 Mere record notice is not enough. 3 There is no Code require-
ment that the buyer act reasonably or diligently in protecting her
interest.5 4 A buyer who chooses not to inquire into the state of the
title or existence of outstanding liens is protected in the same manner
as the innocent buyer who does not think about conducting an
investigation.
and sold by a lessee after the expiration of the lease. Although the Court refers to the
good as "stolen," it would more appropriately be characterized as "converted" be-
cause possession by the lessee/converter had originally been lawful. Id. at 108-09; see
Daphne D. Sipes, Effects of Conversion and Trade Custom on Article 2 Thies, 11 Am.
J. Trial Advoc. 277, 280-282 (1987) (discussing difference between theft and conver-
sion); see also Christensen v. Pugh, 36 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1934) (stating focus of theft
is conduct of thief, while "gist of conversion is... wrongful deprivation" of rightful
owner).
51. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b); see; e.g., Christopher v. McGehee, 183 S.E.2d 624, 626
(Ga. Ct. App.) (finding that buyer entitled to damages where good conveyed subject
to superior security interest of which buyer had no knowledge and under which good
was repossessed), affd, 186 S.E.2d 97, 98 (Ga. 1971); Elias v. Dobrowolski, 412 A.2d
1035 (N.H. 1980) (holding seller liable for breach of warranty of title where inventory
sold was subject to valid security interest).
52. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b) provides that the seller warrants against encumbrances of
which buyer has "no knowledge" and U.C.C. § 1-201(25) defines "knows" and
"knowledge" as "when [a person] has actual knowledge." See U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 1
(noting the knowledge requirement of § 2-312(1)(b) means "actual knowledge as dis-
tinct from notice"); Elias, 412 A.2d at 1036-37 (holding that the buyer was entitled to
recover under warranty of title where buyer had constructive notice, but not actual
knowledge of security interest in goods); Christopher, 183 S.E.2d at 626 (holding that
warranty of title was breached unless the buyer has actual knowledge of defect, thus
buyer's uncontroverted testimony that he had no actual knowledge of lien sufficient
to permit buyer to recover where car was sold subject to recorded lien); William D.
Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales 84 (3d ed. 1976) (explaining that the justification for
actual knowledge standard in warranty of title is that buyer will pay less if the buyer
knows of any outstanding encumbrance but the price will not reflect the lien if buyer
does not have actual knowledge).
53. See, e.g., Sumner v. Fel-Air, Inc., 680 P.2d 1109, 1113 n.8 (Alaska 1984) (dis-
missing, as irrelevant, seller's contention that documents of title filed with FAA gave
buyer constructive notice of superior interest because UCC requires actual knowl-
edge on the part of the buyer); Elias, 412 A.2d at 1036-37 (holding that actual knowl-
edge and not mere notice of outstanding filed security interest are necessary to defeat
a claim for breach of warranty of title).
54. Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:03 (explaining that buyer is under
no duty to check the filing offices for security interests in goods to be purchased);
Sipes, supra note 50, at 293 (explaining, in a warranty of title action, the buyer need
not prove he acted in good faith to determine whether goods were subject to an en-
cumbrance); see, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp., 681 F.2d 365,
376 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the buyer's failure to search records for outstanding
liens does not constitute bad faith), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Northern 11i-
nois Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121, 125 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (holding
that buyer had no duty to search the records for liens before buying an airplane from
the dealer); D'Englere v. Lander Motors, Inc., 84 S.E.2d 460, 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954)
(stating that there was no burden on purchaser to search records throughout the state
to determine if goods sold were subject to outstanding liens).
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The warranty also protects the buyer from claims against the goods
asserted by third parties. The warranty may also be breached when
a third party disturbs the possession of the buyer by raising a colora-
ble claim to the good.56 Most courts agree that the warranty is
breached if the buyer must defend against a colorable claim, regard-
less of whether the claim is ultimately determined to be superior to
that of the buyer 7.5  A provision in the proposed revision to section 2-
312 would codify this majority rule.5 8
55. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 1; Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:02 at 387
(explaining that the buyer is entitled to hold goods "in peace, free from concern that
substantial claims can be made impugning his ownership rights or disturbing his abil-
ity to sell the goods"); see City Car Sales, Inc. v. McAlpin, 380 So. 2d 865, 867 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1979) (casting of substantial shadow over purchaser's title to automobile is
sufficient to violate the warranty of title), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1980);
Ricklefs v. Clemens, 531 P.2d 94, 99-100 (Kan. 1975) (recognizing that a shadow on
title was sufficient for finding a breach of the warranty of title); Mercer v. Braziel, 746
P.2d 702, 705-06 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that seller breached warranty of title
where claim of insurance company that vehicle was stolen casted a shadow on title
regardless of the validity of the claim).
56. Although Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-312 states that the common law warranty
of quiet possession was abolished under the Code, the Comment goes on to explain
that "[d]isturbance of quiet possession, although not mentioned specifically, is one
way, among many, in which the breach of the warranty of title may be established."
U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 1. The Comment also emphasizes that the buyer should receive
good title, rightfully transferred, "so that he will not be exposed to a lawsuit in order
to protect it." Id.; see Wright v. Vickaryous, 611 P.2d 20, 22 (Alaska 1980) (holding
that failure of seller to disclose to buyer that security interests in goods were released
resulted in a cloud on buyer's title sufficient to constitute a breach of the warranty of
title); American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., 268 A.2d 313, 317-318
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970) (stating that a purchaser of goods "has a right to rely
on the fact that he will not be required, at some later time, to enter into a contest over
the validity of his ownership"); Saenz Motors v. Big H. Auto Auction, Inc. 653 S.W.2d
521, 525 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that confiscation by government agency of
automobile was a breach of warranty of title regardless of whether the automobile
was actually stolen), affd, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
57. See, e.g., Frank Arnold Contractors, Inc. v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 806 F.2d
462, 464 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that the majority of courts find a breach of warranty of
title where buyer demonstrated cloud on title regardless of whether third party claim-
ant's title was ultimately proved as superior); Jefferson v. Jones, 408 A.2d 1036, 1039-
40 (Md. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the buyer was entitled to recover damages for
breach of warranty of title when the buyer was subjected to third party's claim to
goods, even if third party's claim ultimately determined to be inferior to buyer's title);
Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172, 175-176 (S.D. 1995) (holding that a better rule was
that the initiation of a colorable, non-spurious claim against title was sufficient to
establish a breach of warranty of title regardless of whether the claim was ultimately
determined to be superior to the buyer's title); Horta v. Tennison, 671 S.W.2d 720, 723
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding the trial court's finding of a breach of warranty of
title where the buyer's "quiet possession" had been disturbed by one claiming to be
the owner); White & Summers, supra note 45, § 9-12, at 488-89 (stating that the rule
that seller is liable for damages to a buyer who must defend title to goods is the
"better" rule).
58. Draft, Article 2, supra note 42, § 2-312(a)(1) (providing that the seller war-
rants that the "transfer is rightful and does not unreasonably expose the buyer to a
lawsuit").
[Vol. 652430
REVISING U.C.C. § 9-504
If the seller breaches the warranty of title, the seller is liable to the
buyer for damages.59 The buyer, generally, is entitled to more than
the return of the purchase price paid.' As damages for a breach of
the warranty of title, the seller must pay the buyer damages for loss of
the good plus incidental and consequential damages.61 When the
seller has breached a Code warranty, the buyer's measure of damages
is the difference between the value of the goods as accepted and as
warranted at the time and place of acceptance.62 This is also the mea-
sure of damages for a breach of the warranty of title' 3 unless the court
finds special circumstances which justify damages of a different
amount.' If a buyer purchases a good without receiving good title,
59. U.C.C. § 2-711.
60. See, eg., Jerry Parks Equip. Co. v. Southeast Equip. Co., 817 F.2d 340,343 (5th
Cir. 1987) (finding that the appropriate measure of damages for a breach of warranty
is the value of the goods at the place of acceptance, and not return of the purchase
price); Metalcraft, Inc. v. Pratt, 500 A.2d 329, 336 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (noting
that the courts have "uniformly rejected" purchase price as proper measure of dam-
ages in warranty of title actions); Bremen Elevator Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
216 N.W. 203,205-06 (N.D. 1927) (holding that the buyer's damages in suit for breach
of warranty of title was not limited to purchase price); Colton, 540 N.W.2d at 176
(holding that the measure of damages for breach of warranty of title is the value of
the goods at time of dispossession). But see Landmark Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit
Corp., 662 N.E.2d 971, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (stating, in dicta, that under Kentucky
law, the buyer was only entitled to recover the purchase price paid, not fair market
value of good, for breach of warranty of tile).
61. U.C.C. § 2-714; see, e.g., Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby, 703 F. Supp. 511, 521-
523 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (explaining buyer entitled to damages under U.CC. § 2-714,
including incidental and consequential damages, for breach of warranty of title); Col-
ton, 540 N.W.2d at 176-177 (same); see also Peel v. St. Ann, 3 La. App. 447 (1926)
(holding, in pre-UCC case, buyer may recover actual loss suffered not purchase price
in warranty of title action).
U.C.C. § 2-714 (2) and (3) provide:
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the
time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under [sec-
tion 2-715] may also be recovered.
U.C.C. § 2-714(2)-(3).
62. U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
63. See Jerry Parks, 817 F.2d at 343 (finding that under U.C.C. § 2-714(2), the
appropriate measure of damages for breach of warranty is the value of the goods at a
place of acceptance); Metalcraft, 500 A.2d at 336 (explaining that provisions of U.C.C.
§ 2-714(2) with respect to damages for breach of warranty also apply to breaches of
warranty of title). See generally Roy R. Anderson, Buyer's Damages for Breach in
Regard to Accepted Goods, 57 Miss. LJ. 317, 365-68 (1987) (discussing the measure of
damages for breach of warranty of title under the U.C.C.); Jane M. Draper, Annota-
tion, Measure of Damages in Action for Breach of Warranty of Title to Personal Prop-
erty Under U.C.C. § 2-714, 94 A.L.R.3d 583, 583-93 (1979).
64. U.C.C. § 2-714(2); see Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80, 85 (S.D.N.Y.)
(noting that the New York courts have used special circumstances exception to U.C.C.
§ 2-714(2) when determining breach of warranty of title involving unique goods),
rev'd on other grounds, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982); Metalcraft, 500 A.2d at 336 (find-
ing damages may be different than value of goods at time of acceptance if special
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the value of the good as accepted is zero.65 The value of the good as
accepted with good title, would be the fair market value of the goods.
The buyer, therefore, will be entitled to recover-as damages for the
seller's failure to convey good title-the fair market value of the
goods. This amount may be greater or less than the purchase price
paid.66
The buyer, in appropriate cases, may also recover incidental and
consequential damages. Recoverable incidental damages include ex-
penses which are "reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transpor-
tation and care and custody" of the goods. 67 These expenses generally
arise from the buyer's need to deal with the goods or obtain their
replacements. 68 Consequential damages arise not from the buyer-
seller relationship, but from the special needs of the buyer which the
seller may reasonably foresee.69 Examples of consequential damages
which may be recoverable include damages for loss of use of the good,
finance charges, sales and use taxes paid on the good, and repair
circumstances exist); Schneidt v. Absey Motors, Inc., 248 N.W.2d 792, 798 (N.D.
1976) (using date of dispossession as date for determining damages where good had
appreciated since purchase).
65. See Jerry Parks, 817 F.2d at 343 (explaining calculation of value of goods in
determining damages for breach of contract).
66. One example of when the fair market value of the goods may exceed the
purchase price is when the good is purchased at a foreclosure sale. Meadows, supra
note 2, at 203-04, 206 (noting that the price of good at foreclosure sale is generally
below the fair market value); see also Craig H. Averch & Michael J. Collins, Avoid-
ance of Foreclosure Sales as Preferential Transfers: Another Serious Threat to Secured
Creditors?, 24 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 985, 989-90 (1993) (arguing that foreclosure sales
often do not generate even liquidation value of collateral sold); William H. Henning,
An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclosures:
Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 257, 258 (1985) (noting that courts may
sustain foreclosure sales even though the collateral was sold for far less than market
value).
67. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) provides:
Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses rea-
sonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody
of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses
or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable
expense incident to the delay or other breach.
U.C.C. § 2-715(l).
68. See Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (S.D. 1995) (finding that costs
associated with the impoundment and retrieval of a truck confiscated by government
officials were recoverable as incidental damages-reasonable expenses in dealing with
the truck resulting from the breach of warranty of title). See generally Petroleo Brasi-
leiro, S.A., Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)(discussing plaintiff's right to recover incidental damages).
69. Petroleo Brasileiro, 372 F. Supp. at 508 (explaining consequential damages do
not arise from buyer-seller relationship but from buyer's special requirements for the
goods). U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) provides:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any
loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
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costs.7" If the buyer has incurred expenses in defending title to the
good, the buyer is entitled to indemnification for these amounts, in-
cluding reasonable attorney fees.7 A buyer who has paid damages to
the true owner of the good is also entitled to indemnification from the
seller for the damages paid.72
Additionally, the seller may be liable for the damages not only to its
immediate buyer but also to remote buyers who purchase the good
later. While courts are currently split on whether a remote buyer can
recover from a seller,73 the proposed revision to section 2-312 would
make it clear that the warranty does extend to remote buyers.74
H". POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH EXTENDING WARRANTY OF TITLE
COMPLETELY TO FORECLOSURE SALES
As previously stated, secured parties who sell collateral at foreclo-
sure sales do not warrant title. The proposed revision to Article 9
70. See Anderson, supra note 63, at 354-62 (discussing the categories of conse-
quential damages); see also Riggs Motor Co. v. Archer, 240 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. 1951)
(holding that the buyer was entitled to recover the costs of repairs and improvements
to the vehicle as consequential damages in warranty of title action); Rex Auto Ex-
change v. Hoffman, Inc., 84 Pa. Super. 369 (1925) (holding that where the seller knew
that the buyer was a dealer of used cars, the court could reasonably assume that the
seller knew that the buyer would refurbish car, and, therefore, the buyer was entitled
to recover the costs of repairs to vehicle as damages for breach of warranty of title).
71. See, eg., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493
S.W.2d 385, 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a buyer in a warranty of title action
may recover expenses incurred in defense of title to good, including attorney fees);
Colton, 540 N.W.2d at 178 (holding that attorney fees incurred to clear title were
recoverable, while attorney fees incurred in litigation between buyer and seller were
not); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513, 527 (Wis. 1978) (finding that
attorney fees and costs incurred in defense of third party claim recoverable as conse-
quential damages in warranty of title action unless specifically included in the statute
or contract of the parties); see also Alterman Foods, Inc. v. G.C.C. Beverages, Inc.,
310 S.E.2d 755, 757-58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a buyer was entitled to re-
cover as consequential damages attorney fees incurred in defense of a third party
claim in a warranty action); Noel v. Wheatly, 30 Miss. 181, 192-93 (1855) (holding, in
early common law case, buyer entitled to recover cost of defending title from seller in
warranty of title action). See generally David T. Schaefer, Note, Attorney's Fees for
Consumers in Warranty Actions-An Expanding Role for the U.C.C?, 61 Ind. LJ. 495
(1986) (discussing recovery of attorney fees in breach of warranty actions).
72. U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a) binds a seller, who, after receiving notice of a claim
against its buyer, refuses to defend warranty action brought by third party, to the
outcome of the litigation between the buyer and third party. See Universal C.LT.
Credit Corp., 493 S.W.2d at 392 (discussing a buyer's right to indemnification in war-
ranty of title action).
73. See David Frisch & John D. Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers,
and Documents of Title, 45 Bus. Law. 2289,2300-01 n.62 (1990) (discussing the current
division of the courts regarding whether seller is liable to a remote buyer for a breach
of the warranty of title under the current version of U.C.C. §§ 2-312 and 2-318). Com-
pare Mitchell v. Webb, 591 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding lack of
privity between remote buyer and seller no defense to suit for breach of warranty of
title) with Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby, 703 F. Supp. 511, 519 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (re-
jecting lack of privity as defense in action by remote buyer).
74. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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would change this by extending full Article 2 warranty of title protec-
tion to purchasers at foreclosure sales. While the goal of the drafters
of the revisions to Article 9-to protect purchasers at foreclosure
sale-is a laudable one, the manner in which the drafters have chosen
to accomplish this goal is faulty. The wholesale adoption of the Arti-
cle 2 warranties of title into a foreclosure sale will result in a number
of potential problems, which, at a minimum, will result in litigation,
and at worst, will create more harm than that which it was intended to
remedy. This section will look at several problems created by impos-
ing the warranty of title under Article 2 to its fullest extent to a selling
secured party.
A. Warranty of Title and Foreclosure Sales
The theory behind holding a seller liable for defects in the title,
even when the seller has no knowledge or notice and has at all times
acted reasonably and honestly, rests on a basic assumption: that the
current seller by dealing with the former owner is in a better position
to determine potential problems with the title." Each buyer and
seller in the chain of title to a good is assumed to have this capability
thus requiring each to investigate and not purchase blindly. The seller
has special knowledge with respect to the circumstances under which
it obtained and used the good, and has greater knowledge about prior
owners and potential claimants. The seller, because of its greater
knowledge or access to the history of the good, assumes the risk of a
prior defect in the title, even if the seller has no knowledge of the
defect.76 In a voluntary sale under Article 2 in which the warranty of
title is implied,77 the seller generally represents that it owns the goods
75. See, e.g., Basiliko v. Pargo Corp., 532 A.2d 1346, 1349 (D.C. 1987) (stating
where sale failed due to circumstances with knowledge of seller, it would be unfair to
require buyer to suffer loss due to mistake); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Skyline Air
Parts, Inc., 193 A.2d 72, 74 (D.C. 1963) (noting that the seller, because of his owner-
ship, has superior knowledge of potential claims against a good by third parties; he
must bear risk of its inability to convey title to buyer because of a third party claim).
76. See, e.g. Crook Motor Co., 703 F. Supp. at 520 (holding a seller of stolen truck
liable for breach of warranty of title, but not fraud, when the buyer failed to prove
that the seller knew that the vehicle was stolen); Ricklefs v. Clemens, 531 P.2d 94, 99-
100 (Kan. 1975) (same); Riggs Motor Co. v. Archer, 240 S.W.2d 75, 75-76 (Ky. 1951)(finding innocent seller liable for breach of warranty in sale of stolen good); Brokke v.
Williams, 766 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Mont. 1988) (finding pawn broker liable for breach of
warranty of title even though seller did not know that goods sold were stolen); Marvin
v. Connelly, 252 S.E.2d 562, 563 (S.C. 1979) (stating, in dicta, that a seller is "not
saved by his own ignorance" in action for breach of warranty of title").
77. Article 2 generally governs voluntary transactions regarding sales of goods.
See U.C.C. § 1-102 & cmts. 1-2 (describing purpose of U.C.C. to promote expansion
of commercial practices); U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (defining agreement as "bargain of the
parties in fact"); U.C.C. § 2-102 (providing Article 2 applies to transactions in goods);
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (defining sale as "passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price").
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and is selling its interest. 7 These general assumptions coupled with
the seller's representation to the buyer that the seller owns the goods
provides ample justification for imposing strict liability on the seller if
the title to the good is defective.
Neither of these underlying premises are valid, however, with re-
spect to a secured creditor's position at foreclosure sales. The selling
secured party does not represent to the buyer that it owns the good.
Buyers at a properly conducted foreclosure sale know that the seller
holds a security interest in the good, and that the seller is selling the
debtor's interest in the good.79 Recognizing the distinct nature of
sales by a party other than the owner, the drafters of the Code pro-
vided that the warranty of title does not attach to a sale when the
buyer has reason to know that the seller does not claim title or is only
selling a limited interest.80 Historically, sales of this type, in which the
warranty of title did not attach, included judicial sales and foreclosure
sales, including those conducted under Article 9.81 This exemption
78. See U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (limiting warranty of title if seller purports not to be the
owner'or to be selling only a limited interest); see also Fulwell v. Brown, 121 N.W.
265, 267 (Mich. 1909) (stating that modem rule in England and United States is that
sale of personal property implies affirmation by seller that he owns property and has
right to sell it); Motley v. Darling, 98 A. 384 (NJ. 1916) (finding warranty of title in
sale in which buyer paid full price and circumstances showed intent to transfer abso-
lute title).
79. See, e.g., Niland v. Deason, 825 F.2d 801, 811 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a
secured creditor only has security interest in collateral-title never vests in creditor
therefore, in foreclosure sale, the debtor's interest is transferred directly to pur-
chaser); Sandel v. Burney, 714 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (same).
80. U.C.C. § 2-312(2); see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. Equitable Fin. Manage-
ment, 708 F. Supp. 678, 683 (W.D. Pa.) (holding that suspicious circumstances should
have put buyer on notice of potential claims against machinery), aff'd, 882 F.2d 81 (3d
Cir. 1989); Simmons Mach. Co. v. M & M Brokerage, Inc., 409 So. 2d 743, 752-53
(Ala. 1981) (finding warranty of title did not attach to transfer where buyer knew of
possible security interest in good); Landmark Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,
662 N.E.2d 971, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding, under Kentucky law, buyer knew
or should have known that title to good was questionable and that seller was selling
only interest it had at foreclosure auction, thus making no warranty of title to buyer).
81. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 5. The comment provides that:
Subsection (2) recognizes that sales by sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors
and persons similarly situated are so out of the ordinary commercial course
that their peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer and there-
fore no personal obligation is imposed upon the seller who is purporting to
sell only an unknown or limited right.
Id.; Vend-A-Matic, Inc. v. Foothill Capital Corp., 37 B.R. 838, 841-42 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1984) (finding that no warranty of title attached to secured creditor's sale of
bankrupt debtor's assets); Harris Intertype Corp. v. Robertson, 16 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (declining to find secured party liable for breach of warranty of
title in resale of collateral after debtor's default); Stuart v. American Sec. Bank, 494
A.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that caveat emptor applies to foreclo-
sure sales); Marvin v. Connelly, 252 S.E.2d 562, 563 (S.C. 1979) (explaining the law is
"well settled that where property is sold at a judicial sale, there is no warranty of title
flowing to the purchaser and he buys only the interest which the debtor.., had in the
property"). But see Russell A. Hakes, A Quest for Justice in the Conversion of Security
Interests, 82 Ky. LJ. 837, 898-99 (1993-94) (questioning whether the provisions of
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from the warranty of title extended to protect a seller even from liabil-
ity for defects which were caused by the seller's actions.82
The greater knowledge that is assumed ordinarily on the part of the
seller is not present in a foreclosure sale. Accordingly, courts have
long rejected extending warranty of title liability to foreclosing se-
cured creditors and reasoned that the creditor and purchaser were in
equal positions to determine defects in the chain of title because the
seller, who was not the owner of the good, did not deal with previous
sellers.83 In obtaining its interest in the good to be sold, the foreclos-
ing secured party dealt with the debtor who is now losing the good
involuntarily. The seller, a secured creditor, rather than the owner,
neither purchased the good initially, dealt with prior owners, nor has
any special knowledge regarding the circumstances surrounding the
debtor's acquisition of the good. The seller and purchaser are on al-
most equal footing in this regard. Because the seller was in no better
position to determine the existence of title defects than the purchaser,
the purchaser was left to do her own search to determine if there were
U.C.C. § 9-504 that require the application of Article 2 to sales may result in the
application of warranty of title liability in foreclosure sales). The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggests that no warranty of title at-
taches to Article 9 foreclosure sales under the current versions of U.C.C. §§ 2-312 and
9-504. See U.C.C. § 9-504(a) cmt. 1 (Discussion Draft, Sept. 2, 1993) [hereinafter 1993
Draft, Article 9]. The Committee has proposed to change this by revising § 9-504(a)
of the Code. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504(a).
82. See, e.g., Hutson v. Wood, 105 N.E. 343, 348 (Ill. 1914) (holding that a pur-
chaser at an execution or judgment sale is not entitled to the return of the price paid
even if the sale is void because of a seller's lack of power to sell); Diversified, Inc. v.
Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 720-23 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a foreclosure pur-
chaser is not entitled to recover lost profits or purchase price paid from a secured
party even where the sale is void due to secured party's wrongful conduct). But see
Basiliko v. Pargo Corp., 532 A.2d 1346, 1349 (D.C. 1987) (holding that in foreclosure
sale, the seller, at least, warranted that it had the right to sell); Bogestad v. Anderson,
173 N.W. 674, 675 (Minn. 1919) (holding that a seller who knowingly sold collateral
after mortgage had been discharged was liable to the purchaser for damages).
83. See Stuart, 494 A.2d at 1338 (explaining that a trustee selling at a foreclosure
sale is under no duty to investigate or to notify a buyer of outstanding encumbrances);
Barnard v. Duncan, 38 Mo. 170, 186 (1866) (stating that "[w]here the facts, or means
of information, concerning the condition and value of the thing sold are equally acces-
sible to both parties," a seller is under no greater duty than a purchaser to ascertain
validity of title); Diversified, 702 S.W.2d at 722 (stating that the law does not require a
foreclosing creditor to investigate or otherwise act reasonably to protect a purchaser
from a void foreclosure sale).
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title problems. s4 Thus at common law,s under the U.S.A.' and the
Code,' there was no implied warranty of title in a foreclosure sale.
This, of course, would change if the current proposal to amend section
9-504 is adopted by the NCCUSL and enacted by the states.
Under the proposed revision, the warranty of title will be implied in
Article 9 foreclosure sales providing purchasers of repossessed collat-
eral with title protection heretofore limited to Article 2 buyers. This
change reflects the drafters' desire to extend the benefits of title war-
ranties to these purchasers.' The drafters' belief that foreclosure
sales were not so out-of-the ordinary as to warrant the different treat-
ment of purchasers in these sales also contributed to the desire to ex-
tend the warranties.89 The Study Group which initially reviewed
Article 9 for possible revision recognized that foreclosure purchasers
received no protection if title failed to pass as a result of the foreclo-
sure sale.90 Only a revision to the Code could accomplish this
change.91
The current proposal will accomplish a complete about-face from
current Code and common law and impose liability on the seller not
only for defects caused by the seller, but also for those which pre-
dated its interest in the good.92 The seller will not only warrant its
84. See Stuart, 494 A.2d at 1338 (stating that purchaser at foreclosure sale can and
should make his own investigation into the title to the good prior to purchase); Diver-
sified, 702 S.W.2d at 722 (holding that a purchaser at foreclosure sale does so "at [his]
own risk," and that the obligation to investigate is on purchaser not secured creditor).
85. See Harris v. Lynn, 25 Kan. 281 (1881) (finding no warranty of title in judicial
sale pursuant to mortgage); Cohn v. Amidown, 24 N.E. 944 (N.Y. 1890) (denying
purchaser recovery under warranty of title in sale by mortgagee); see also Villiston,
supra note 13, § 220 (explaining that at common law those who sold under authority
of law or fact, including foreclosing mortgagees, did not warrant title).
86. See U.S.A., supra note 28, § 216(4) (stating that the section providing for war-
ranty of title in sale of good "shall not, however, be held to render liable a sheriff,
auctioneer, mortgagee, or other person professing to sell by virtue of authority in fact
or law goods in which a third person has a legal or equitable interest.").
87. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 5; see also Vend-A-Matic, Inc. v. Foothill Capital Corp. 37
B.R. 838, 841-42 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (finding no warranty of title in sale of
bankrupt debtor's assets by secured lender); Harris Intertype Corp. v. Robertson, 16
Cal. Rptr. 159, 165 (1961) (holding that no warranty of title is implied in the sale of
collateral by secured party after debtor's default).
88. See Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504 reporter's cmt. 2.
89. Id § 9-504 reporter's cmt. 2 (explaining draft rejects assumption that foreclo-
sure sales are "out of the ordinary course" or "peculiar").
90. See id. § 9-504(4) reporter's cmt. 3 (recognizing that under current U.C.C. § 2-
312 and the comments thereto no warranty of title attaches to judicial or foreclosure
sale).
91. 1d.; id. § 9-504 reporter's cmt. 2 (explaining draft conflicts with current law as
explained in official comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-312, which clarifies that no warranty of
title attaches to judicial or foreclosure sales).
92. U.C.C. § 2-312(4) provides for an additional warranty given in certain transac-
tions, the warranty against infringement. Sellers who are merchants with respect to
goods of the kind sold warrant that the goods "shall be delivered free of the rightful
claim of any third person by way of infringement or the like." U.C.C. § 2-312(4)
(quoting unnamed source). Although generally a secured party will not be a
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right to transfer the goods under a valid security interest, but will also
warrant both that the debtor's title is good and that no unknown en-
cumbrances exist.93
Under the warranty of title as extended to foreclosure sales, if the
seller does not transfer good, unencumbered title to the purchaser, it
will have breached the warranty. If the good is subject to any encum-
brances which survive the sale,94 the seller will be responsible for cur-
ing the defect, or incur liability for damages.95 If the seller fails to
convey good title to the purchaser, the seller will also be liable to the
purchaser for damages, generally equal to the fair market value of the
merchant with respect to the good sold, a financing seller who reposes and sells the
collateral may be. This warranty, however, will generally not apply to a typical fore-
closure sale. For discussions of the warranty against infringement under this section,
see William F. Dudine, Jr., Warranties Against Infringement Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 36 N.Y. St. B.J. 214 (1964) and Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Warranties
Against Infringement in the Sale of Goods: A Comparison of U. C.C. § 2-312(3) and
Article 42 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16
Mich. J. Int'l L. 441 (1995).
93. U.C.C. § 2-312(1).
94. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) provides that the sale by the secured creditor after default
discharges the debtor's interest, the interest of the selling secured party and any inter-
est subordinate to the seller. Interests which have priority over that of the seller sur-
vive. E.g., Continental Bank v. Krebs, 540 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (InI. App. Ct. 1989)
(finding that the senior secured party retains a security interest in the collateral
notwithstanding junior creditor's sale of collateral after debtor's default); Chadron
Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 459 N.W.2d 718, 732-33 (Neb. 1990)
(explaining that under the U.C.C., a senior secured party's lien is not discharged byjunior creditor's foreclosure sale of collateral); see also David Frisch, The Implicit
"Takings" Jurisprudence of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 Fordham L.
Rev. 11, 23-24 (1995) (noting that a buyer at foreclosure sale takes collateral subject
to any lien superior to that of the seller); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1939-40 (1994) (stating that a senior lien survives the
sale of collateral after default); Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Eco-
nomic and Fiduciary Perspectives, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 445, 457 (1994) (explaining the
interest acquired by a foreclosure purchaser from a junior secured creditor
subordinate to a senior creditor's lien).
95. Catlin Aviation Co. v. Equilease Corp., 626 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Okla. 1981)
(holding that a seller breached warranty of title when seller refused to clear filed lien
on good); see U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b); Dugdale of Nebraska, Inc. v. First State Bank, 420
N.W.2d 273, 276-77 (Neb. 1988) (holding that a seller not only warranted title but was
obligated to transfer title free from encumbrances); State v. DeBaca, 487 P.2d 155,
158 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (finding that a buyer was entitled to rescind contract and
recover damages where a seller warranted, but failed to deliver, unencumbered title
to automobile); Seymour v. W.S. Boyd Sales Co., 127 S.E.2d 265, 268-69 (N.C. 1962)
(holding that a buyer was entitled to recover for breach of warranty of title where a
seller failed to discharge lien on good sold); White v. Mid-City Motor Co., 284 S.W.2d
689, 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that seller's failure to deliver automobile
clear of liens constituted breach of warranty of title under the Uniform Sales Act); see
also Old Pueblo Motors, Inc. v. Ysias Abarca, 288 P. 666, 667 (Ariz. 1930) (holding
that a seller was entitled an opportunity to defend title before being held liable for
breach of warranty of title); Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:07 (explaining
that a seller should generally be permitted to cure defect in title under U.C.C. § 2-508
to avoid liability for breach of warranty of title).
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good.96 The fair market value will generally be significantly higher
than the purchase price paid at the foreclosure sale because the price
paid for collateral sold through foreclosure sales is often well below
fair market value.97 In addition, the seller may be liable for incidental
and consequential damages that can include costs and attorney fees
incurred by the purchaser in defending the title,98 damages for losing
use of the good, costs of repairs, taxes, and finance charges paid.
The Code damages for which the seller will be liable are likely to
greatly exceed the amount realized at the foreclosure sale.
To protect itself against this potential liability, a prudent secured
creditor will feel compelled to investigate the validity of debtor's title
to the collateral. Investigating at the time of default would be useless
because the creditor already has taken an interest in the good at the
time of the granting of the security interest. Thus to protect itself, a
secured creditor would have to do a title investigation at the time of
the granting of the security interest with the expectation that any de-
fects or potential clouds on the title would prevent the creditor from
lending. This investigation would be different than that which is cur-
rently conducted-a search of the filing records to see if there are
prior outstanding security interests or liens. The creditor would have
to identify the debtor's predecessors in interest to determine the valid-
96. See Jerry Parks Equip. Co. v. Southeast Equip. Co., 817 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.
1987) (finding that in the absence of other proof the measure of damages in warranty
of title action is fair market value of good as measured by bargain price); Itoh v. Kini
Sales, Ltd., 345 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419-20 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (holding that the amount of dam-
ages recoverable in warranty of title action is the value of property when the buyer
dispossessed). See generally Draper, supra note 63, at 583-93 (discussing cases apply-
ing U.C.C. § 2-714 measure of damages to warranty of title actions).
97. See Thornton v. Citibank, 640 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (App. Div. 1996) (noting fore-
closure sale often grosses substantially less than fair market value of collateral sold);
Averch & Collins, supra note 66, at 989-90 (observing foreclosure sales, generally con-
ducted swiftly and without sufficient opportunity for competitive bidding, typically
yield amount less than liquidation value); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclo-
sure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bank-
ruptcy, 79 Va. L. Rev. 959, 959-60 (1993) (noting prices paid at foreclosure sales
typically substantially below market value); see, e.g., Sierra Fm. Corp. v. Brooks-Far-
rer Co., 93 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding a sale commercially reason-
able even though winning bid was $500 for collateral with fair market value in excess
of $27,600); School Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 685 S.W.2d 200, 203-04 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding that the sale for $20,564 of collateral worth over $163,000 was
commercially reasonable).
98. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d
385, 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding buyer, in warranty of title action, may collect
costs and attorney fees incurred in defending title after giving seller of notice of po-
tential third party claim); see also Chemco Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 366 F. Supp. 278, 286 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (holding seller liable for attor-
ney fees expended on defense of third-party claim). See generally Schaefer, supra
note 71, at 496-97 (discussing a buyer's right to recover attorney's fees in breach of
warranty actions).
99. Roy R. Anderson, Incidental and Consequential Damages, 7 J.L & Com. 327,
360-364 (1987) (discussing types of incidental and consequential damages recoverable
in warranty actions).
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ity of each of their titles and the potential for outstanding claims
against these earlier owners. While there may be some advantages to
this approach, it would complicate and add expense to the secured
transaction with little resulting benefit. Most debts do not result in
foreclosure, and of those that do, many will not involve potential third
party claims to the collateral. The creditor will have to weigh the risk,
the potential liability, the chance of default, and the likelihood of a
third party claim to the collateral. In order to fully protect the seller's
interests, these factors will need to be considered before the granting
of the security interest. This added step in the granting of the security
interest will increase cost and complicate the consummation of the
secured transaction, which will, in turn, increase the cost of secured
credit.' 00
While providing for a complete warranty of title in a foreclosure
sale should increase the amount paid in foreclosure sales by providing
additional protection for purchasers, it comes at significant cost. If
creditors must determine the adequacy of the debtor's title prior to
the granting of the security interest in order to minimize the risk of
lending against the collateral, the increased realization may be wholly
or partially offset by the transaction costs incurred in every secured
transaction.
This provision, which completely shifts the risk of title defect from
the purchaser to the seller, runs counter to the central goals of the
Code. When Article 9 of the Code was adopted, it was intended to
simplify secured lending.' 0' Unlike lending under the Code's prede-
cessors, financing in compliance with the Code and its requirements
was intended to be simple, easy, and predictable." z By making se-
cured lending simple, it also made credit less costly and more readily
available. 103 Enacting a provision that increases the risks, complexity,
and costs associated with secured lending is inconsistent with the goals
of Article 9.
100. The cost of credit to the debtor depends on both the transaction costs and risk
associated with the loan to the creditor. See F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtor Name
Changes and Collateral Transfers Under 9-402(7): Drafting from the Outside-In, 52
Mo. L. Rev. 57, 81-83 (1987) (explaining that the effect of risk and transaction costs
on the cost of loans to debtors); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry
into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 909, 939
(1995) (commenting that commercial law should be cost-effective).
101. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2); id. § 9-101 cmt., at 822.
102. The official comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 explains that "[tihe aim of this Article
[9] is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of
present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with
greater certainty." U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt., at 822; see Schwarcz, supra note 100, at 939
(noting that "commercial law should be practical and cost-effective").
103. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt, Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 Va. L. Rev.
1783, 1795 (1994) (explaining that Article 9 is designed to decrease the cost of secured
lending).
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The effects of enacting such provisions may be felt the most by
those who can least afford it-small businesses and individuals. Small
or occasional lenders are an important source of credit for these types
of debtors."4 These lenders are also the most susceptible to increased
risk and costs.1°5 Without the resources available to large financial
institutions and commercial lenders, these smaller entities are less
likely to decide to lend when the risks and costs of lending increase,
because these lenders do not have the resources necessary to mini-
mize the risk.106 If these lenders do lend, the cost of credit to their
customers will rise to reflect the increased risk and costs imposed by
the extension of the warranty of title.107 While this extension of the
warranty of title may help foreclosure purchasers and some debtors,
small businesses and individual debtors may be faced with tighter and
more expensive credit, a result inconsistent with the goals of the
Code.' 08
B. Warranty Disclaimers
A potential response to these concerns could be that the seller may
simply disclaim the warranty of title. The Code warranty of title can
be disclaimed. The process of disclaiming, however, is not simple.
This warranty may only be excluded or modified by specific language
referencing the warranty of title. 1°9 Unlike the Code warranties of
quality, the warranty of title is not disclaimed by language such as "as
104. See Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute Bar Rule in UCC Foreclosure Sales: A
Prescription for Waste, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 695, 741-43 (1993).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Knippenberg, supra note 100, at 81.
108. The increased expense and risk for smaller lenders and the tightening of credit
for their clients is inconsistent with the goals of Article 9-to make secured transac-
tions less costly and less risky. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2 (noting that the goals of Article 9
are to decrease expense and increase certainty associated with secured lending). Ad-
ditionally, the principal drafter of Article 9 has noted that it was intended to make
lending safe for all lenders, including smaller ones. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith
Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Drafts-
man, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 620 (1981) (noting that Article 9 intended to make secured
lending safe for smaller lenders).
109. U.C.C. 2-312(2); Lawson v. Turner, 404 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that seller must use "very precise and unambiguous language" to ex-
clude the warranty of title); Shelly Motors, Inc. v. Bortnick, 631 P.2d 594, 596 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1981) (stating that the UCC requires strict compliance with the method by
which the warranty of title can be excluded), aftd, 664 P.2d 755 (Haw. CL. App. 1983);
Jones v. Linebaugh, 191 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (same); Sunseri v.
RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc., 374 A.2d 1342, 1344-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
(holding that the language in the bill of sale-which stated "[s]eller shall in nowise be
deemed or held to be obligated, liable or accountable upon or under any guarant[ejes
or warranties, in any manner or form including, but not limited to, the implied war-
ranties of title"-was not sufficiently specific to disclaim warranty of title under
U.C.C. § 2-312). The proposed revisions to Article 2 will also clarify the steps neces-
sary to disclaim the warranty of title. The revision would add the following language
to U.C.C. § 2-312:
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is" or "with all defects.""1 To be effective, the disclaimer should be
conspicuous and clarify to the purchaser that the seller assumes no
obligation with respect to title."'
The proposed revision to section 9-504 recognizes that the warranty
can be disclaimed. 1 2 The most recent draft provides:
Warranties under this section may be excluded or modified in the
contract for disposition by giving a purchaser a written statement
that contains specific language excluding or modifying the warran-
ties. Language in a written statement is sufficient to exclude war-
ranties under this section if it states "There is no warranty relating
to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, or the like in this disposition,"
or words of similar effect. 1
3
Thus it appears that a creditor who complies with this language may
disclaim the warranty and thereby avoid liability for breach of war-
ranty of title. The revision drafters intend for this to be an option for
the creditor. 14
Experienced secured creditors may choose to disclaim liability.
While disclaiming the warranty of title is difficult, it is not impossible,
particularly for sophisticated lenders. Thus, the creditor disclaims lia-
bility even for defects caused by its wrongful actions." 5 While this
A warranty under subsection (a) may be excluded or modified only by spe-
cific language or by circumstances giving the buyer reason to know that the
seller does not claim title or purports to sell only such right or title as the
seller or a third party may have. Language in a record is sufficient to ex-
clude warranties under this section if it is conspicuous and states "There is
no warranty of title or against infringement in this sale," or words of similar
effect.
Draft, Article 2, supra note 42, § 2-312(b).
110. See, e.g., Brokke v. Williams, 766 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Mont. 1989) (holding that
warranty of title is not disclaimed by the posting of large fluorescent signs on seller's
premises which stated merchandise sold "as is"). U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) recognizes that
general language such as "as is" or "with all faults" can be used to effectively disclaim
all implied warranties. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 6 notes, however, that the warranty of title
is not designated as an "implied" warranty, therefore a disclaimer of the warranty of
title is governed by U.C.C. § 2-312(2) which requires specific language and not the
more general provisions of § 2-316. See Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:05
(explaining that specific language referencing warranty of title is necessary in the dis-
claimer because general disclaiming language suggests risk with respect to good's
quality not title).
111. Hudson v. Gaines, 403 S.E.2d 852, 853-54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (finding issu-
ance of certificate of title stating title "may be subject to undisclosed liens" insuffi-
cient to disclaim warranty of title); Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 2-312:05
(stating that a disclaimer should "make it brutally clear to the buyer that the seller is
undertaking no responsibility for the title"); see Sunseri, 374 A.2d at 1345 (finding
attempted disclaimer of warranty of title ineffective where it was unlikely to "catch
the eye of an unsophisticated buyer").
112. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504(a).
113. Id.
114. Id- § 9-504 reporter's cmt. 2.
115. A creditor who knowingly and wrongfully transfers an asset to which it does
not have title or the right to transfer may be guilty of fraud. See Cady v. Pitts, 625 P.2d
1089, 1092 (Idaho 1981) (holding a seller liable for fraud when the seller failed to
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does have the benefit over current law of ensuring that the purchaser
knows that she is assuming all risks, it may further deflate the price of
the collateral. It may be that only infrequent, or smaller lenders will
actually give the warranty because large lenders, having participated
in the process and knowing what the sale involves, will have sufficient
information to know to disclaim the warranty., 6
The question remains whether a secured creditor should be allowed
to disclaim the warranty at all. The revision makes it clear that a cred-
itor should give notice of the disclaimer to the purchaser. The pro-
posed revision, however, ignores the interest of an important party-
the debtor. At least as currently drafted, the provision does not re-
quire either notice to or the debtor's consent when the creditor exer-
cises its right to disclaim this warranty.
A disclaimer, however, will directly affect the debtor's interests.
Assuming that the warranty of title is valuable to a purchaser, a dis-
claimer would lower the price paid by the purchaser, and thus either
increase the deficiency owed by the debtor or decrease the surplus to
which the debtor is entitled." 7 An important consideration is whether
the creditor should be allowed to affect the rights of the debtor in this
significant manner without notice and consent. While the proposed
version acknowledges the right to disclaim, there is no indication that
the Committee has considered the question as it relates to the debtor's
interests in the outcome of the sale)' Comment 2 discusses the Arti-
cle's approach to the disclaimer focusing on the seller's obligations
and the transferee's protection. The comments completely ignore the
debtor's interest in the conduct of the sale regarding the warranty is-
sue." 9 During the revision process, the drafters should consider the
disclose a lien on goods sold and sold goods in contravention of an agreement with
another party); see also Levin v. Nielsen, 306 N.E.2d 173, 185-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973)
(affirming that the secured creditor's acts in wrongfully withholding title to a motor
vehicle from buyer in the ordinary course of business was fraudulent). The Code
expressly permits the use of common law, including fraud, to supplement its provi-
sions. U.C.C. § 1-103 (providing that unless supplanted by provisions of Code, princi-
ples of law and equity, including fraud, supplement the Code). Thus, there may be, in
limited circumstances which amount to fraud, some remedy for a purchaser whose
title fails due to the wrongful conduct of its seller.
116. Lloyd, supra note 104, at 740 (noting small and inexperienced lenders most
likely to make mistakes in the repossession and resale of collateral); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L Rev.
595, 644-45 (1995) (noting Article 9 product of process captured by lending industry);
Scott, supra note 103, at 1808 (explaining that counsel for large banks and finance
companies has provided important input into the proposed revisions to Article 9).
117. U.C.C. § 9-504 provides that a debtor is entitled to any monies and obligated
to pay for any debt remaining after payment of the interest secured, costs of sale, and
subordinate interests of creditors who have provided notice to the seller. U.C.C. § 9-
504.
118. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504, reporter's cmt. 2.
119. Id
1997] 2443
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
effect that a warranty disclaimer may have on the debtor's interest in
the collateral and the debt. 120
Because the conduct of the sale, and the secured party's actions sig-
nificantly affect the debtor's interests, secured parties conducting sales
under Article 9 have significant constraints on their actions compared
to sellers under Article 2. Both Article 2 and Article 9 sellers must act
in good faith. 12 1 Article 9 sellers must also, prior to the sale, provide
notice of the proposed sale to the debtor, guarantors, and certain se-
cured parties. 22 The secured creditor is also obligated to conduct the
sale in a "commercially reasonable" manner. 23 These limitations on
the seller's actions exist in Article 9 to protect the debtor and her
interest in the collateral and the debt. Because the debtor is losing
her interest in the property 124 and will remain liable on any unsatisfied
portion of the debt, 25 insuring fairness to the debtor is an important
goal of the default provisions of Article 9.126 Consistent with the need
to protect the debtor, any attempt by a secured creditor to disclaim
the warranty of title in a foreclosure sale should not only satisfy the
Code's specific requirements regarding disclaimers, but it should also
be made in good faith and be commercially reasonable.
If the creditor is required to act in good faith and reasonably, the
creditor may be limited in its ability to disclaim. If disclaimers of the
warranty of title are uncommon in the trade for the sale of goods simi-
lar to the collateral, a creditor who attempts to disclaim may run the
risk of having a court find that the sale was not commercially reason-
120. Scott, supra note 103, at 1806 (noting that debtors as a group have less cohe-
sive interests than secured parties, thus resulting in less debtor's participation in and
influence over the drafting of Article 9); Schwarcz, supra note 100, at 938 (observing
that fairness requires consideration of law's effect on affected parties who may not be
fully represented in rulemaking process).
121. U.C.C. § 1-203 provides:
Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement.
U.C.C. § 1-203.
This section applies to both Article 2 and Article 9 sales. See, e.g., Sons of Thunder,
Inc. v. Borden, No. A-37, 1997 WL 104592, at *14 (N.J. 1997) (stating that both par-
ties to a contract for the sale of goods have the duty to act in good faith in the per-
formance of the contract); Kruse v. Voyager Ins. Cos., 648 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ohio
1995) (noting the primary Code restraints on secured party's conduct of foreclosure
sale are good faith and commercial reasonableness). Additionally, under Article 2,
the sales contract and its terms must not be unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-302. This
section is also under consideration for revision. The revision may extend the uncon-
scionability proscription to conduct as well. Draft, Article 2, supra note 42, § 2-105
(proposed as revision to current U.C.C. § 2-302).
122. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
123. Id.
124. Id § 9-504(4) (providing that debtor's interest in collateral is extinguished by
sale of collateral after default).
125. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (providing that debtor remains liable for any deficiency af-
ter sale of collateral).
126. Lloyd, supra note 104, at 704, 709-10.
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able. A creditor's good faith obligation and the commercial reasona-
bleness requirements compel the creditor to act in a manner which
will maximize, to the extent possible, the amount received for the col-
lateral. 27 The creditor can only conduct a sale, which is designed to
maximize price, or face potential liability.1t
The Code gives a secured creditor great latitude in the conduct of
the foreclosure sale.'2 9 The creditor may determine the method, man-
ner, time, place, terms, and other aspects of the conduct of the sale
with one restriction: the sale, in all respects, must be commercially
reasonable. 130 This includes the terms of the contract under which the
good is sold.' 3'
The Code does not define commercial reasonableness. 132 The par-
ties may do so, but the obligation of commercial reasonableness may
127. See Crosby v. Reed, 176 B.R. 189, 195 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994) (noting secured
party must use reasonable care and diligence in disposing of collateral after default to
obtain "reasonable price"), aff d, 85 F.3d 634 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1996); Brunswick Corp.
v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970) (noting that the policy of the U.C.C.
providing flexibility to a secured party's conduct in a foreclosure sale was intended to
produce maximum amount on disposition of collateral); A to Z Rental, Inc. v. Wilson,
413 F.2d 899, 909 (10th Cir. 1969) (finding that the secured creditor should exercise
due diligence to obtain the best price possible for collateral at a foreclosure sale);
Lloyd, supra note 104, at 711.
128. The creditor need not, however, actually maximize price. U.C.C. § 9-507(2)
specifically provides that "[t]he fact that a better price could have been obtained by a
sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured
party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commer-
cially reasonable manner."
129. After repossession, the Code permits a secured party to sell the collateral by
public or private sale. U.C.C. § 9-504(3). The collateral may be sold as a single unit or
in parcels. Il The creditor can chose any manner, method, time, place, and terms so
long as the disposition is commercially reasonable. d.
130. Id.; see also id. § 9-504 cmt. 1 (stating the "'only restriction placed on the se-
cured party's method of disposition is that it must be commercially reasonable."); id.
§ 9-507(1) (providing debtor with a remedy for the secured party's failure to comply
with the requirements of Part 5 of Article 9, including the commercial reasonableness
requirement); id § 9-507 cmt. 1 (stating that the "principal limitation of the secured
party's right to dispose of collateral" is commercial reasonableness and good faith);
id § 9-507(2) (providing guidelines to be considered when determining commercial
reasonableness of secured party's disposition of collateral). The parties may delineate
what they mean by "commercial reasonableness" but the requirement may not be
waived. Id. § 1-102(3) (providing parties may not waive, but may determine standards
by which reasonableness may be judged if the standards are not manifestly unreason-
able.); hi § 9-501(3) (providing that the rights of the debtor and duties of the secured
party in Part 5 of Article 9 may not be waived but the standards may be agreed to if
not manifestly unreasonable).
131. Id § 9-504(3) (requiring that all aspects of disposition, including terms, must
be commercially reasonable); id. § 9-504 cmt. 6 (stating "specifically... method, man-
ner, time, place and terms" must be commercially reasonable).
132. The Code, however, does provide guidelines in U.C.C. § 9-507(2), which state:
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not
of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the collateral in the
usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price
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not be waived.133 Courts generally consider a number of factors to
determine if all aspects of the sale are commercially reasonable, how-
ever, the facts of each individual case are the most important.13 4
When determining the reasonableness of a sale, courts will look at the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the sale to determine
whether the overall transaction was fair and reasonable. 35 In con-
ducting a reasonable sale, the creditor is expected to use every advan-
tage in time, place, and manner on the debtor's behalf. 3 6 While the
current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type
of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner.
Id. § 9-507(2).
133. Itt § 1-102(3) (providing parties may not waive, but may determine standards
by which reasonableness may be judged if the standards are not manifestly unreason-
able); id. § 9-501(3) (providing that the rights of the debtor and duties of the secured
party in Part 5 of Article 9 may not be waived but the standards may be agreed to if
not manifestly unreasonable); id. § 9-501(3)(b) (providing that standards for § 9-
504(3), which include the commercial reasonableness requirement, may be deter-
mined by agreement of parties); see also United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589
F.2d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting under U.C.C., commercial reasonableness re-
quirement may not be waived by the debtor).
134. See In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 F. Supp. 665, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d
1393 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that the "aggregate of circumstances in each case" should
be considered when reviewing commercial reasonableness of foreclosure sale); Sierra
Fin. Corp. v. Brooks-Farrer Co., 93 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425-26 (Ct. App. 1971) (upholding
trial court's finding, based on facts of case, that foreclosure sale was commercially
reasonable); Westgate State Bank v. Clark, 642 P.2d 961, 971 (Kan. 1982) (holding
whether foreclosure sale is commercially reasonable depends on particular facts of
each case). Factors which courts consider in determining the commercial reasonable-
ness of a foreclosure sale include:
1. Choice of public or private sale; 2. Sale at wholesale or retail price; 3. Sale
as unit or in parcels; 4. Price realized on foreclosure sale; 5. Price realized on
subsequent sale; 6. Time of sale; 7. Place of sale; 8. Solicitation and receipt of
bids; 9. Publicity; 10. Appraisal; 11. Sale with or without repair; 12. Familiar-
ity with type of property; 13. Judicial approval of disposition: 14. Secured
party's purchase of collateral; 15. Sale of bankruptcy debtor's property; 16.
Sale on or at price current in recognized market or in accordance with rea-
sonable commercial practices; or 17. Other factors.
Crosby v. Reed, 176 B.R. 189, 195-96 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 85 F.3d 634 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1996); see also Richard C. Tmney, Annotation, What Is "Commercially Rea-
sonable" Disposition of Collateral Required by UCC § 9-504(3), 7 A.L.R. 4th 308, 316
(1981) (discussing factors relevant to court's determination of commercial reasonable-
ness of foreclosure sale).
135. Bezanson v. Fleet Bank, 29 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting commercial
reasonableness depends on all circumstances of sale, not one particular factor); Van
Dorn Retail Mgmt. v. Jim's Oxford Shop, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 476, 484 (D.N.H. 1994)
(discussing totality of circumstances as proper method to determine reasonableness of
foreclosure sale), affd, 45 F.3d 424 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 F. Supp. at
670-71 (stating reasonableness of sale must be determined by viewing transaction as a
whole). See First Bank v. VonEYE, 425 N.W.2d 630, 636 (S.D. 1988), and Westgate
State Bank, 642 P.2d at 969, for discussions of the totality of the circumstances
standard.
136. Estate of Kiamie v. Colonial Trust Co., 130 N.E.2d 745, 747 (N.Y. 1955); see
Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 203 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Wis. 1973) (holding se-
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Code does not require the price to be maximized, 13 7 the creditor is
expected to make choices regarding the conduct of the sale with the
expectation that they will result in a fair price.'
3
The purpose behind the commercial reasonableness requirement is
to provide a selling secured party with flexibility in the sale of the
collateral, and thereby permit the creditor to choose an appropriate
method to maximize the price obtainable. 139 Maximizing the price
will ultimately benefit both the secured party and the debtor by either
minimizing the deficiency for which the debtor is liable or maximizing
the surplus to which the debtor is entitled.14 Fairness to the debtor in
the conduct of the sale and regarding price are important concerns of
section 9-504.141
Even though the revision to section 9-504 recognizes disclaimers as
an option, 42 the creditor's exercise of this option is still limited by the
commercial reasonableness requirement. 43 While Article 9 gives a
secured party flexibility in conducting the sale, courts have recognized
that the secured party's choice among options authorized by the Code
is not absolute; the choice itself must be commercially reasonable.'"
cured party has duty to use all fair and reasonable means to obtain best price for
collateral on disposition).
137. See U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (providing that the "fact that a better price could have
been obtained" by a different manner of sale "is not of itself sufficient to establish
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner").
138. See, eg., Crosby, 176 B.R_ at 195 (noting foreclosing secured creditor must
exercise reasonable care and diligence to obtain reasonable price for collateral);
Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970) (noting policy of
U.C.C. is to give secured party flexibility in disposition of collateral to maximize
amount received on sale).
139. Barkley Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 4.07, at 4-107 (rev. ed. 1993); Lloyd, supra note 104, at 711 (noting
major goal of Article 9 provisions regulating foreclosure sales is to obtain fair price on
debtor's behalf).
140. Clark, supra note 139, 4.07.
141. Lloyd, supra note 104, at 711.
142. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504 cmt. 2 (stating that § 9-504 "explicitly
contemplates that these warranties [of title, possession and quiet enjoyment] can be
disclaimed").
143. See First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W2d 914, 924 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)
(suggesting common law foreclosure sale is not unreasonable where other U.C.C.
warranties disclaimed, but warranty of title was not).
144. E.g., Aspen Enters. v. Bodge, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 768-69 (Ct. App. 1995)
(noting, that although the U.C.C. gives the secured party the choice to sell the collat-
eral consisting of real estate and personal property as unit, the secured party may only
do so if the joint sale is commercially reasonable); Trimble v. Sonitrol of Memphis,
Inc., 723 S.W.2d 633, 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the U.C.C. gives the
secured party a choice to dispose of collateral by either public or private sale, which-
ever is more commercially reasonable); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp.,
280 F. Supp. 698, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (finding, that although the language of U.C.C.
§ 9-504(3) appears to give the secured creditor unfettered choice between a public or
private sale, the requirement that all aspects of sale must be commercially reasonable
applies to that choice; therefore, the creditor must chose the type of sale according to
which is more commercially reasonable), affd, 398 F2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968); see also
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While the Code permits a creditor to sell the collateral at either a
public or private sale, courts have generally required that the choice
between these two methods be commercially reasonable.145 For ex-
ample, secured parties who have conducted public sales when a pri-
vate sale would have been more reasonable, and likely to result in a
higher realization on the collateral, may be held liable for failing to
conduct a commercially reasonable sale. 46 The Code also recognizes
that a secured party may choose to sell the collateral "in its then con-
dition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or
processing. ' 147 This language seems to give the creditor an unre-
strained option to decide whether to prepare the collateral for resale.
Most courts which have addressed this issue, however, have held that
the commercial reasonableness may require the creditor to prepare
the collateral prior to sale if selling the collateral in its existing condi-
tion would not be commercially reasonable.' 48 Commentators, includ-
White & Summers, supra note 45, § 25-10, at 1217-18 (noting secured creditor's choice
of one method of sale over another must be commercially reasonable).
145. United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 258-59 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
secured party's choice as to method of sale, public or private, must be commercially
reasonable); John Deere Leasing Co. v. Fraker, 395 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Iowa 1986)
(noting that the secured party's choice between public and private sale itself may be
fact relevant to commercial reasonableness of sale); Ridley v. First Nat'l Bank, 531
P.2d 607, 610 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that the method of resale, including
whether it should occur through public or private sale, was an element for determin-
ing commercial reasonableness), cert. denied, 521 P.2d 602 (N.H. 1975); Appleton
State Bank v. Van Dyke Ford, Inc., 279 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Wi. 1979) (stating that the
choice of method of sale must be reasonable); cf. U.C.C. § 2-706 cmt. 4 (providing
that in resale by seller after buyer's breach "[i]n choosing between a public and pri-
vate sale the character of the goods must be considered and relevant trade practices
and usages must be observed").
146. See, e.g., Willis, 593 F.2d at 259-60 (holding that the government, as a secured
lender, is not entitled to recover a deficiency where the government's choice of a
public sale was not commercially reasonable). In Willis, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found a public foreclosure sale by the Small Business Administration unrea-
sonable. Id at 249-59. The government had received offers from private parties to
purchase the collateral for $200,000 and $210,000. Id. at 250. The auctioneer who
conducted the public sale of the collateral estimated the value of the collateral if sold
at auction to be $45,000. Id. at 259. Despite this information, the S.B.A. proceeded to
sell the collateral through a public sale. Id This choice, the court held, was unreason-
able and rendered the sale commercially unreasonable. Id. As a result, the govern-
ment lost its right to a deficiency judgment. Id at 260; see also U.C.C. § 9-507
(providing creditor liable for damages to debtor for failure to comply with the re-
quirements of Part 5 of Article 9, which include conducting a commercially reason-
able sale).
147. U.C.C. § 9-504(1).
148. E.g., Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Miller Mining Co., 817 F.2d 1424, 1428 (9th
Cir. 1987) (holding that the failure to inspect collateral and make the necessary minor
repairs prior to the foreclosure sale was commercially unreasonable); Liberty Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool, 540 F.2d 1375, 1382 (10th Cir. 1976) (finding that the
commercial reasonableness standard applied to the preparation of collateral for sale
as well as to the conduct of foreclosure sale); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Barnes,
705 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding the chancellor's finding that
the sale was not commercially reasonable when the secured creditor failed to make
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ing drafters involved in the current revision process, have agreed that
commercial reasonableness constrains choices of the creditor, even
where the choice is permitted by the Code.
149
Thus the mere fact that the Code authorizes the creditor to disclaim
the warranty of title does not mean that courts will find that such dis-
claimers are, in all instances, commercially reasonable. If a court de-
termines that, in a particular case, the disclaimer of the warranty
unfairly deflates the price and therefore is unreasonable, the secured
party would be liable to the debtor for violating the requirements of
Article 9.150 The creditor's choice to disclaim the warranty in light of
the Code's requirement that all aspects and terms of the sale be com-
mercially reasonable will give debtors a further avenue to attack the
validity of the foreclosure sale. This issue, which has not been consid-
ered in the Article 9 revision process, will result in increased litigation
by debtors challenging foreclosure sales, which in turn will increase
the costs and uncertainty associated with foreclosure sales.
Another issue that courts will need to resolve will be the proper
industry against which the secured party's actions will be judged re-
reasonable repairs that could have resulted in higher price); Franklin State Bank v.
Parker, 346 A.2d 632, 635 (NJ. Union County Ct. 1975) (holding that the secured
party's failure to make minor repairs before sale that resulted in a grossly inadequate
price realized at the foreclosure sale was not commercially reasonable); see also In re
Severance Truck Line, Inc., 35 B.R. 332, 333 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (finding sale
commercially unreasonable where condition of collateral deteriorated in secured
party's possession and secured party failed to repair collateral before foreclosure
sale); cf. In re Deephouse Equip. Co. v. Knapp, 38 B.R. 400, 405 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984) (finding that secured creditor's retention of collateral without making repairs,
which resulted in reduced value of collateral, was commercially unreasonable). But
see C.I.T. Corp. v. Duncan Grading & Constr., Inc., 739 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a creditor is not required to repair or prepare collateral prior to a fore-
closure sale).
149. In the comments to the spring 1996 draft of the revisions to Article 9, the
drafters recognize that, while the Code "appears to give the secured party the choice
of disposing of collateral" with or without reasonable preparation, many courts have
found that the commercial reasonableness standard may require the secured creditor
to prepare or process the collateral prior to the foreclosure sale. Draft, Article 9,
supra note 8, § 9-504 cmt. 3. The comment goes on to acknowledge that the secured
party does not, in all circumstances, have the right to sell without preparation, despite
the Code language, if it would be commercially unreasonable to do so. Id. at 213. This
is a recognition that even acts authorized by the Code must be commercially reason-
able in the context of the particular foreclosure sale being conducted by the secured
party. An act, although authorized by the Code, which is not commercially reason-
able in a particular context can render the sale of the collateral unreasonable and
subject the creditor to liability. White & Summers, supra note 45, § 25-13, at 1231
(explaining even though words of Code which indicate secured party can sell collat-
eral "in its then condition," a majority of courts require secured party to prepare
collateral for sale if failing to do so is commercially unreasonable); Draft, Article 9,
supra note 81, § 9-504 cmts. 1-3, at 212-13 (noting that the drafters agreed that, de-
spite language of Code which appears to give creditor choice, secured party should
not be allowed to sell collateral without preparation or processing if to do so would be
commercially unreasonable).
150. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
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garding the reasonableness of the disclaimer. Secured creditors will
argue that the appropriate industry should be the foreclosure industry.
Creditors may argue that because imposition of the warranty of title is
in contravention of common law and prior uniform laws, it is reason-
able for the secured creditor to disclaim the warranty. Additionally,
although under the current Code it is unnecessary, it has not been
uncommon for foreclosing creditors to provide in the contract of sale
that no warranty of title is given. 5' Creditors can find support for
analogous situations where courts have judged the reasonableness of
actions against the conduct of similarly situated creditors in foreclo-
sure sales. 15
2
Debtors will press for comparison of the creditor's actions to sales
of similar goods in the market for goods of that kind, where disclaim-
ers of the warranty of title are less common. The Code recognizes
that a sale consistent with the practices found in the general market
for the type of property sold will be commercially reasonable. 53 Re-
lying on this provision of the Code, courts have judged the creditor's
actions with respect to a foreclosure sale against the norm of the mar-
ket in which similar goods are generally sold. 154 Using the general
market as the standard against which the creditor's actions will be
judged will more likely result in a finding that the disclaimer of the
warranty is unusual and therefore, commercially unreasonable. Dis-
couraging the disclaimer of the warranty of title would be consistent
with the goals of the default provisions of Article 9-to insure fairness
to the debtor and maximize price. Once the Code has provided for
warranties in foreclosure sales, protecting the debtor's interest from a
disclaimer of the warranty, when such disclaimers are uncommon in
sales of property similar to the collateral, will increase the realization
on the collateral. This should be an important consideration, particu-
larly when the debtor has not consented to this term.
It has been noted that unsophisticated lenders are the most likely to
make mistakes that result in a finding that a sale was not commercially
151. Hakes, supra note 81, at 898-99.
152. See, e.g., Piper Acceptance Corp. v. Yarbrough, 702 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir.
1983) (comparing the creditor's actions to the standard in the foreclosure industry to
determine commercial reasonableness of sale).
153. U.C.C. § 9-507(2) provides that a secured party who sells "in conformity with
reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has
sold in a commercially reasonable manner."
154. See, e.g., United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir.
1978) (upholding the District Court finding that the sale was commercially unreasona-
ble when the collateral at issue was the standard type of collateral sold at a regional or
national level, yet the seller made no effort to reach this market); Connecticut Bank
& Trust Co. v. Incendy, 540 A.2d 32, 3940 (Conn. 1988) (noting sale is commercially
reasonable if it conforms to reasonable commercial practices of dealers in that type of
property); Franklin State Bank v. Parker, 346 A.2d 632, 635 (N.J. Union County Ct.
1975) (stating that a secured party has an affirmative duty to dispose of collateral in a
manner consistent with the trade practices among responsible business in same or
similar business).
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reasonable. 155  The imposition of another area of uncertainty will
open up further sales to attack by debtors and cause further problems
for these small lenders. It was never the intent of the drafters of Arti-
cle 9 that only large, sophisticated lenders with the assistance of coun-
sel could comply with Article 9.156 The more complicated the drafters
make foreclosure sales, the more the Code contravenes its own
goals. 157
If a court finds the creditor conducted a sale which was not com-
mercially reasonable, the creditor, at a minimum, is liable to the
debtor for any damages that result from the creditor's failure to com-
ply with the Code.' 58 The creditor may also lose the right to a defi-
ciency judgment. 5 9 Thus, the creditor is not only subject to the time
155. Lloyd, supra note 104, at 740 (explaining it is unsophisticated lenders, such as
rural banks, local credit unions and small businesses, which are most likely to run
afoul of the commercial reasonableness requirements).
156. Id.; see Gilmore, supra note 108, at 620 (noting that Article 9 intended to make
secured lending safe for "widows[,] orphans[,] and country bankers").
157. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (providing purpose of U.C.C. is to simplify and clarify
commercial law); id § 9-101 cmt. (stating that the aim of Article 9 is to simplify se-
cured transactions); United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting
policy of Article 9 to provide simple, efficient and flexible method for disposition of
secured collateral); Schwarcz, supra note 100, at 924-25 (suggesting that clarity and
simplicity should be purposes which influence the drafters as they revise U.C.C.).
158. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) gives the debtor a right to recover damages from a secured
party that does not comply with Part 5 (Default Provisions) of Article 9. Se4 e.g.,
Georgia Cent. Credit Union v. Coleman, 271 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(finding that a debtor has a right to recover any losses suffered due to the creditor's
failure to comply with the commercial code); Peoples Acceptance Corp. v. Van Epps,
395 N.E.2d 912, 916-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the debtor is entitled to
damages when a creditor failed to sell collateral in a commercially reasonable manner
in violation of the U.C.C.); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Holston, 559 P.2d 440,443
(Okla. 1976) (noting debtor entitled to damages for commercially unreasonable sale
conducted by secured creditor).
159. Generally, the creditor is entitled to collect from the debtor any deficiency
between the amount of the debt and the proceeds generated from the sale after de-
duction of the costs of sale. U.C.C. § 9-504(2). However, if a creditor fails to comply
with the requirements of U.C.C. § 9-504 in conducting the foreclosure sale, it may lose
this right. See Topeka Datsun Motor Co. v. Stratton, 736 P.2d 82, 86-87 (Kan. CL App.
1987) (holding that the consumer debtor was relieved of liability for deficiency judg-
ment when the creditor violated the U.C.C. in disposition of the collateral); Whirly-
birds Leasing Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 749 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that when a creditor violates the Commercial Code, the creditor
is barred from a deficiency judgment). But see In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896,
902-06 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a secured creditor's failure to comply with the
default provisions of Article 9 merely raises a rebuttable presumption that the fair
market value of the collateral at a proper sale would have equaled the debt); Barbour
v. United States, 562 F.2d 19, 21-22 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that a debtor's damages
under U.C.C. § 9-507(1) are merely a set-off against secured creditor's deficiency
judgment); Westgate State Bank v. Clark, 642 P.2d 961, 972 (Kan. 1982) (holding that
in a non-consumer commercial transaction, a secured party's failure to comply with
the provisions of the U.C.C. are not an absolute bar to deficiency judgment). For an
overview of the various approaches to this remedy, see Lloyd, supra note 104, at 702-
21 and Kathryn Page, A Secured Party's Right to a Deficiency Judgment After Non-
compliance with the Resale Provisions of Article 9, 60 N.D. L Rev. 531 (1984). The
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and expense involved with a lawsuit defending the sale, but also the
creditor may be liable for damages if it looses. If the proposed revi-
sion is ultimately adopted, lenders may be faced with a Hobson's
choice: warrant the debtor's title to the collateral or risk a battle with
the debtor over the reasonableness of the sale. Forcing lenders into
this dilemma runs counter to the Code's goals of simplicity and
certainty. 60
In most instances, a secured party who is selling the collateral after
a repossession is an involuntary seller. 6' If complying with the re-
quirements of section 9-504 in conducting a commercially reasonable
sale prevents or limits the effective disclaimer of the warranty to title
without risking potential liability to the debtor, as suggested above,
these involuntary sellers only choice may be to warrant their right to
sell the goods, the debtor's title, and the title of all the debtor's prede-
cessors-in-interest. Voluntary sellers under Article 2, on the other
hand, can disclaim the warranty with minimal concern for potential
liability. There is nothing in the principles behind the imposition of
warranty of title liability that would justify the imposition of greater
liability on a seller who is selling reluctantly. It is one issue to require
a seller of goods who has voluntarily undertaken to enter the commer-
cial arena to warrant that the chain of title is valid. It is another, how-
ever, to require one who has not entered the sales arena voluntarily to
do so. The potential challenges to the commercial reasonableness of
foreclosure sales could result in voluntary sellers-under Article 2-
having more latitude to protect themselves by disclaiming the war-
NCCUSL Drafting Committee proposes to resolve the split among the courts with
respect to this issue by adopting the rebuttable presumption rule in commercial trans-
actions. See Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-507(c) & reporter's cmt. 3. Under this
rule, the selling secured party's failure to comply with the default provisions of Article
9 raises a rebuttable presumption that a sale in compliance with the Code would have
realized an amount equal to the debt. Tennant Co. v. Martin's Landscaping, Inc., 515
A.2d 665, 669 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (requiring that where creditor sells repossessed
collateral without giving necessary statutory notice, rebuttable presumption arises
that proper sale would have been at amount equal to the outstanding debt).
160. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (stating that the purpose of Article 9 is to simplify
secured transactions and to permit these transactions to proceed in a less costly and
more certain manner); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based
Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2021,
2021 (1994) (stating Article 9 should "facilitate the creation of security interests" and
therefore, transfers of security interests should be "easy, inexpensive, and reliable").
161. There are, of course, instances where a secured party, who is the original fi-
nancing seller of the good, has repossessed and will resell the good. Alternatively, the
secured party may have a repurchase agreement with the original seller whereby upon
default, the original seller will be responsible for payment of the debt to the creditor
and resale of the collateral. For a discussion of repurchase agreements, see Donald J.
Rapson, Repurchase (of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of Deficiency
Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 Idaho L. Rev. 649 (1992). These
secured parties are in the business of selling goods of the same type as the collateral;
while perhaps involuntary sellers of the particular collateral at the time of default,
they are hardly involuntary sellers in a larger sense. It is not with these types of
sellers, who are in the business of selling goods, with which this Article is concerned.
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ranty of title than an involuntary Article 9 seller. There is no justifica-
tion in history, law, or equity for such disparate treatment.
At this early juncture, it is difficult to predict how courts will view
disclaimers of the warranty of title made without consent of the
debtor. It is likely that courts will go both ways on this issue. One
thing is for certain: the revision's approach to warranty of titles and
foreclosure sales will give debtors and their counsel additional ammu-
nition to challenge the conduct of foreclosure sales, thus increasing
the risk and cost of commercial transactions. If the Code's goals are
to promote simplicity, certainty, and cost-effective secured transac-
tions,162 this change, as currently drafted, will not do so.
C. Junior Secured Creditors
This proposed change runs counter to another proposed revision to
section 9-504 regarding to junior secured creditors. A proposed revi-
sion to U.C.C. section 9-504 provides that the proceeds received from
a sale by a junior creditor are not subject to the claims of the selling
senior creditor. 163 The imposition of the warranty of title is in fact
worse for the junior creditor than if the junior creditor only was held
liable to the senior creditor for the proceeds of the sale. One who
purchases at a foreclosure sale takes subject to liens that have priority
over that of the selling secured party. If there is a senior lien and
the purchaser does not know about the senior lien at the time of sale,
the selling creditor has breached the warranty of title by selling the
goods subject to an encumbrance of which the buyer does not have
knowledge. 165 That the superior interest may be on record is not
enough to defeat liability. 6 Having breached the warranty of title,
the junior creditor will be liable to the buyer for damages. The
amount of the purchaser's damages will likely exceed the purchase
price. 67 As we have seen, the junior creditor will be liable even if it
162. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.; see also Harris & Mooney, supra note 160, at 2021 (stat-
ing that Article 9 should expedite the simple and dependable creation of security
interests).
163. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504(e). The proposed revision provides:
(e) A secured party that receives cash proceeds of disposition in good faith
and without knowledge that the receipt violates the rights of the holder
of a security interest or other lien that is not subordinate to the security
interest or agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement is
made:
(1) takes the cash proceeds free of the security interest or other lien;
(2) is not obligated to apply the proceeds of disposition to the satisfac-
tion of obligations secured by a security interest or other lien; and
(3) is not obligated to account to or pay the holder of the security inter-
est or other lien for any surplus.
Id.
164. U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
165. Id § 2-312(1)(b); see also supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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did not know of the superior interest. 163 If a creditor mistakenly be-
lieves that it has a superior interest, repossesses and sells the collat-
eral, and is later determined to be in error,'69 the selling creditor will
be liable to the purchaser for compensatory, incidental, and conse-
quential damages. If the junior creditor did not give the warranty of
title, but was merely liable to the senior creditor for the proceeds of
the sale, the creditor would never be liable for more than the money it
received through the sale.170 Thus, the junior creditor is worse off
under this version of U.C.C. section 9-504 than if it were liable to the
senior creditor for the proceeds. This is inconsistent with the pur-
ported purpose of protecting the interests of junior creditors. 7'
The Code permits the junior secured creditor to sell, but now it
does so at its own peril. The purpose behind sheltering proceeds re-
ceived by junior creditors is to protect the interests of the junior credi-
tors and thus give them the ability to recover their debt from the
collateral. Yet, the warranty of title provisions counteracts this pur-
pose by subjecting the junior creditor to liability for breach of the war-
ranty of title. The warranty of title provision makes the protection
afforded junior creditors by the proposed revision merely illusory.
Again, the revisions to U.C.C. section 9-504 create conflicts that are
likely unintentional, but still must be addressed before this version is
adopted.' 72
168. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
169. A creditor may not be aware that it does not have the security interest with
priority. A creditor with priority may lose that priority to a later creditor who has
obtained super-priority of a purchase money security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
A junior creditor may have inadvertently failed to properly perfect its interest, thus
having the interest subordinated to a later perfecting secured creditor or judgment
lienholder. See id. § 9-301(1).
170. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) provides a method for the distribution of proceeds. Under
this section, the proceeds of disposition are applied in the following order:
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease,
selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agree-
ment and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorney's fees and legal
expenses incurred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under
which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security in-
terest in the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is re-
ceived before distribution of the proceeds is completed.
Id. § 9-504(1).
171. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504 reporter's cmt. 7 (stating that this revi-
sion makes clear that a junior secured party owes no duty to a senior secured party to
apply proceeds to senior interest and is intended to protect interests of junior
creditors).
172. Furthermore, this revision to section 9-504 rewards those purchasers who fail
to search the filing records. If a purchaser does not search the record of title and,
therefore, fails to discover a superior recorded lien, the purchaser is entitled to Code
damages from the seller for breach of the warranty of title because the purchaser does
not have actual knowledge of the superior interest. See Elias v. Dobrowolski, 412
A.2d 1035, 1037 (N.H. 1980) (holding that a buyer was entitled to recover for breach
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I. PROPOSED SOLUrIONS
This Article has identified several potential problems with the pro-
posed revision to U.C.C. section 9-504: (1) the extent of the creditor's
potential liability; (2) the commercial reasonableness restraint on the
creditor's right to disclaim; and (3) the inconsistent treatment of jun-
ior creditors. These demonstrate a larger problem with the revision
process-its piecemeal nature. 173 Each of these problems is caused by
the lack of careful review of the problems created by the current Code
and the failure to address those difficulties in light of the purposes and
policies of the Code as a unified statute." The current review pro-
cess results in inconsistencies, which will increase litigation and uncer-
tainty, each an anathema to the commercial world. 75
A. Inconsistencies Between Warranty of Title in Foreclosure Sales
and Policies of the Code
The current proposal to revise section 9-504 is fraught with inconsis-
tencies. In one section of U.C.C. section 9-504, the Code protects jun-
ior creditors, 76 then within the same section, it exposes these
creditors to substantially more liability than under current law.'" The
drafters justify grafting Article 2 warranties onto foreclosure sales be-
cause such sales are not "out of the ordinary.' 78  Recognizing the
unique circumstances surrounding these types of sales, 179 the Code,
of warranty of title because the buyer had mere constructive notice, but not actual
knowledge of outstanding security interest in goods); Hawkland, supra note 10, § 2-
312:03 (explaining buyer has no duty to search records for outstanding interests in
goods subject to sales contract). If the purchaser searches and gains knowledge of the
lien, there is no protection. If there is no superior interest, the purchaser is in the
same position regardless of whether it conducted a search. The purchaser gains noth-
ing by searching the records. Thus, purchasers at foreclosure sales, have no incentive
to take the steps necessary to protect their interests.
173. See Scott, supra note 103, at 1812 (noting that the drafters working on revi-
sions to the U.C.C. work on only one project and each project is presented for sepa-
rate consideration as an independent entity).
174. See John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code,
29 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 341, 342, 384 (1988) (explaining that the Code was drafted as
unified law and suggesting that inconsistency and lack of uniformity in application of
the Code results from failure of scholars, lawyers, and judges to interpret the Code as
an integrated entity).
175. Id at 355 (explaining the one of the most important attributes of a code is
"maintenance of consistency among various sections of the statute relative to the sub-
ject area covered"); Harris & Mooney, supra note 160, at 2021 (stating that creation
of security interests should be simple and inexpensive).
176. See discussion supra part II.C.
177. See discussion supra part II.C.
178. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504, cmt. 2.
179. Commentators agree that foreclosure sales rarely yield an amount even close
to the fair market value. See e.g., Averch & Collins, supra note 66, at 990 (observing
that foreclosure sales typically yield amounts less than liquidation value); Johnson,
supra note 97, at 959-60 (explaining that prices paid at foreclosure sales are typically
substantially below the value of the collateral). Courts have also long recognized that
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however, still provides that insufficient price is not enough to support
a finding that a foreclosure sale is not commercially reasonable.180
The revision purports to give the creditor the right to disclaim the
warranty by giving notice to the purchaser while ignoring the debtor's
interests in the terms of the sale. At the same time, the Code requires
the creditor to conduct a reasonable sale for the protection of the
debtor. These inconsistencies will make commercial transactions
more costly and unpredictable, cardinal sins for commercial
entities.18
Predictability and stability are two of the prime motivating factors
behind the U.C.C.1' In the commercial arena, often a correct result is
less important than a predictable one.1 83 As the uncertainty surround-
ing foreclosure sales increases, the availability and affordability of
credit decreases. 8' The problems with the current proposed revision,
even if ultimately resolved by the courts, will result in costly and need-
less litigation. The drafters should consider possible solutions that
protect the purchaser without increasing the costs and uncertainty as-
sociated with secured lending.
Having demonstrated that the revision of U.C.C. § 9-504 is flawed,
the more important question is whether there is a better approach to
resolving this issue. Such an approach should consider the dimensions
of the problem identified, examine the Code as an integrated statute,
and seek to draft a solution which is consistent with the policies and
foreclosure sales are out of the ordinary and sufficiently "peculiar" in nature to war-
rant treatment different than that accorded Article 2 sales. See Landmark Motors, Inc.
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 662 N.E.2d 971, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming trial
court's finding that foreclosure sale out of ordinary course and peculiar in nature
should be apparent to prospective buyer); see also U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 5 (reflecting
drafters belief that sales by foreclosing lienors "are so out of the ordinary commercial
course that their peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer"); Thornton
v. Citibank, 640 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (App. Div. 1996) (noting foreclosure sale often
grosses substantially less than fair market value of collateral sold). In "ordinary
sales," the seller seeks to maximize price, yet in these foreclosure ordinary sales, eve-
ryone agrees maximization of price is unlikely.
180. U.C.C. § 9-507(2).
181. See David G. Carlson, Rationality, Accident and Priority Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 207, 235 (1986) (stating that the U.C.C.
was drafted to give business what it wanted: simplicity, uniformity, and certainty);
Gedid, supra note 174, at 384-85 (explaining that proper Code methodology requires
an issue to be considered within its own context, the context of related issues, and the
context of the Code as a whole); Howard Ruda, Article 9 Works-How Come?, 28
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 309, 310 (1994) (noting that Article 9's purpose is to minimize
transaction costs and uncertainty in secured transactions).
182. Carlson, supra note 181, at 235 (observing that the purpose of the U.C.C. is to
provide as much certainty as possible in the commercial arena); Ruda, supra note 181,
at 319 (noting that predictability is an important goal of Article 9).
183. Ruda, supra note 181, at 319 (noting that the ability to predict and plan based
on a certain rule provides equity in commercial law).
184. See William M. Burke et al., Interim Report on the Activities of the Article 9
Study Committee, 46 Bus. Law. 1883, 1884 (1991).
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purposes of the Code. The first step is to identify the purpose behind
this revision.
What are the drafters attempting to accomplish by inserting the
standard liens into these out of the ordinary sales? As my previous
article demonstrated, there are problems with section 9-504 as it cur-
rently exists-in particular, its failure to protect a foreclosure pur-
chaser from a wrongful sale by a secured creditor.'8 A selling
creditor can wrongfully transfer the collateral; thereby, the purchaser
will lose both the collateral (to the debtor) and its money (to the cred-
itor) under the current law. The proposed revision of section 9-504
ignores the debtor/purchaser dispute, focusing instead on the pur-
chaser/seller relationship. This proposed solution goes beyond the
problem of protecting purchasers from the wrongful acts of the seller
to make the selling secured party an insurer of the purchaser's title.
While ignoring one aspect of the problem-the debtor/purchaser dis-
pute-the drafters have gone beyond what is necessary in another.
The drafters of revised Article 9 have failed to tailor the cure to the
ailment and have crafted a broad remedy for a narrow problem and
created further difficulties that have not been considered or
addressed.
The comments explain that the imposition of Article 2 warranties to
foreclosure sales recognizes that these sales are not out of the ordi-
nary stream of commerce.8 6 This stated purpose does not comport
with the realities of the commercial world. Foreclosure sales are not
the same as "ordinary" sales. The seller is not selling merely its inter-
est in the good, but also that of the debtor and subordinate credi-
tors.1s7 Because the seller is transferring the interest of another in the
good, it cannot conduct the sale on whatever terms it chooses; it must
act reasonably on the debtor's behalf. The seller does not reap the
profits of the sale.las Unlike a typical sale where the seller is the
owner of the good, the seller is not always motivated to expend the
effort necessary to realize the highest price possible. s9 Without the
185. See Meadows, supra note 2. The Code does not clearly provide an answer to
the dispute between the debtor and purchaser after a wrongful repossession and sale.
In my previous article, I proposed resolving this aspect of the problem by balancing
the interests of the debtor and purchaser by shifting focus from who has title to the
equities of the particular situation before the court. See id. at 210-17. Unfortunately,
the current revision does not address this issue, but rather leaves the resolution to the
common law and its rigid adherence to title theory.
186. Draft, Article 9, supra note 8, § 9-504 cmt. 2.
187. U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
188. The debtor is entitled to any surplus (profit) on the sale after payment of the
costs of sale, the debt secured, and certain junior interests. See id. § 9-504(1).
189. Zubrow, supra note 94, at 449 (explaining that because Article 9 permits a
secured party to purchase collateral after default in certain situations, a secured party
has a conflict of interest between wanting to increase competitive bidding and there-
fore price to reduce deficiency and wanting to decrease bidding and price as pur-
chaser so it can realize profit upon resale of collateral).
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consent of the debtor, the seller does not have the option to refuse to
sell.'9 ' If the seller wrongfully declares a default and repossesses, the
seller cannot even transfer the good.' 9' Even if the seller conducts
the sale in full compliance with the Code and in all ways acts reason-
ably and in good faith, it is unlikely that the good will yield market
price. If foreclosure sales were truly "not out of the ordinary," then
the reasonableness of the sale should be judged by the same standards
as one would expect from a seller selling its own goods, yet no one is
proposing that approach. The solution to the problem of providing
purchasers protection cannot ignore the reality of the seller's limited
interest in the good and the actual conduct of foreclosure sales. The
solution should provide purchasers with some protection, yet ac-
knowledge the seller's more limited rights and powers.
B. Similar Warranties Within Article 2A
In one type of transaction within the scope of the U.C.C., the lease
of goods, a transfer of a more limited interest is accomplished. In a
lease, the lessor transfers to the lessee the right to possession and use
of the goods for a period of time."9 In this type of transaction, the
lessee also needs some protection against claims which may interfere
with its more limited interest in the goods. In consideration of the
more limited nature of the interests involved, Article 2A of the
U.C.C., which applies to leases of personal property, 93 provides a
more modified approach to protecting the transferee's rights to use of
the goods. Article 2A provides that lessors warrant that they have
done nothing to cause an interference with the lessee's interest.'94
190. U.C.C. § 9-505 permits the creditor to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the
debt unless the debtor objects. This right may be extended to permit retention in
partial satisfaction of the debt in the revised Article 9. See Draft, Article 9, supra note
8, § 9-505.
191. See Meadows, supra note 2, at 172-90 (explaining that a purchaser at foreclo-
sure sale held when the debtor is not in default receives void title, has converted the
good, and cannot transfer good title even to a good faith purchaser for value).
192. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) defining lease as "a transfer of the right to posses-
sion and use of goods for a term in return for consideration." U.C.C. § 2A-103(i)o).
193. Id. § 2A-102.
194. Id. § 2A-211(1). U.C.C. § 2A-211 provides:
(1) There is in a lease contract a warranty that for the lease term no person
holds a claim to or interest in the goods that arose from an act or omis-
sion of the lessor, other than a claim by way of infringement or the like,
which will interfere with the lessee's enjoyment of its leasehold interest.
(2) Except in a finance lease there is in a lease contract by a lessor who is a
merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind a warranty that the
goods are delivered free of the rightful claim of any person by way of
infringement or the like.
(3) A lessee who furnishes specifications to a lessor or a supplier shall hold
the lessor and the supplier harmless against any claim by way of in-
fringement or the like that arises out of compliance with the
specifications.
Id. § 2A-211.
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Article 2A has its basis in Article 2.195 In particular, Article 2 was a
model for the provisions of Article 2A dealing with lease formation,
warranties and remedies.196 The warranty of title provision from Arti-
cle 2, § 2-312, could not be adopted wholesale in Article 2A because
title is not transferred in a lease."9 However, the drafters of Article
2A did provide protection for the lessee's transferred interest through
the warranty against interference.1 9 The warranty against interfer-
ence is similar to the warranty of quiet enjoyment under common law
and the Uniform Sales Act.' 99 The warranty protects the lessee's en-
joyment of the leasehold interest, the lessee's possession and use
against interference. 0 This warranty differs in one important respect
from the warranty of quiet possession under the Uniform Sales Act
and the warranty of title under the Code. The warranty only protects
the lessee against third party claims which arise from "an act or omis-
sion of the lessor."2 0'
This warranty is clearly more circumscribed than that given by a
seller of goods. A seller under the Code, as it was at common law and
under the Uniform Sales Acts, warrants not only defects in the title
caused by its actions, but also those of which it has no knowledge." z
The seller is liable, under the warranty of title, for defects in the title
which arose prior to the seller's interest, even if the seller had no
knowledge of the defect and at all times acted in good faith. 0 3 Under
Article 2A, the lessor is not liable for claims that arise through no
fault of the lessor, even if the claim interferes or entirely defeats the
lessee's possession.2°
The justification for this distinction is two-fold. In a lease transac-
tion, only a limited interest, possession and use for a specified term, is
transferred. 0 5 The more limited nature of the interest transferred jus-
tifies more limited liability on the part of the lessor. Because the les-
sor is only liable for claims that arise through its acts or omissions, the
lessor will be in a better position to weigh the potential costs associ-
195. Amelia H. Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner and
Scholar Alike, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 575, 600 (1988).
196. Edwin E. Huddleson, I., Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A-Leases,
39 Ala. L. Rev. 615, 618-21 (1988).
197. See Boss, supra note 195, at 600. Compare U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (defining sale as
"passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price") with U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)G)
(defining lease as "transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in
return for consideration").
198. a d § 2A-211(1).
199. Id. § 2A-211 cmt.
200. Id § 2A-211(1).
201. Id.
202. See generally discussion supra part I.D.
203. See discussion supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
204. Hawkland & Miller, supra note 10, § 231.
205. U.C.C. § 2A-211 cmt. (stating modifications in Article 2A to extent of war-
ranty of title from Article 2 reflect limited interest that is transferred under lease).
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ated with the warranty.20 6 If a lessee desires more protection from
hidden interests, it can negotiate for that protection. By weighing
the interest of the lessee to receive unrestricted possession and use of
the good with that of the lessor in minimizing the risks and costs in-
volved with the transaction, the drafters of Article 2A struck a bal-
ance which provides lessees with protection and lessors with
predictability.
Selling secured parties are transferring more limited interests as do
lessors. Selling secured parties can transfer the debtor's interest, its
interests and any interest in the collateral subordinate to the seller's,
but the interest of any creditor which is superior to that of the seller is
not transferred.20 8 Furthermore, the creditor's right to convey this in-
terest is conditioned on the debtor's default.20 9 Historically, selling
secured parties did not warrant title because of this more limited
transfer and the fact that the seller was not and was known not to be
the owner of the good.2 10 An approach similar to that adopted for
leases in Article 2A would result in the selling secured party warrant-
ing that no claims, which are caused by an act or omission on the part
of the seller, will arise to defeat the purchaser's interest in the good.
The selling secured party would essentially warrant its own conduct
with respect to the collateral and the foreclosure sale.
At least two cases have suggested that the distinction between war-
ranting the debtor's title and warranting the seller's own conduct in
foreclosure sales is a legitimate one. These two courts which have
considered the issue of a purchaser's rights against a selling lienholder
when the lienholder sells without authority to do so have adopted an
206. lIa (explaining that because "the scope of the protection is limited to claims or
interests that arose from acts or omissions of the lessor, the lessor will be in position
to evaluate the potential cost, certainly a far better position than that enjoyed by the
lessee").
207. Id
208. Id. § 9-504(4).
209. Il § 9-501 (providing that after debtor is in default, the secured party has
rights under Part 5 of Article 9); id. § 9-504 (providing that a seller may dispose of
collateral after default); see 2 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property
§ 43.3, at 1190-91 (1965) (noting that a secured party cannot act against collateral to
collect on a debt unless the debtor in default); Meadows, supra note 2, at 168 (ex-
plaining the creditor's right to repossess and resell collateral conditioned on debtor's
default); see also Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 46-47 (Okla. 1984)
(holding that repossession of collateral where debtor not in default constitutes con-
version on the part of the secured creditor); Trimble v. Sonitrol of Memphis, Inc., 723
S.W.2d 633, 642-43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding the secured creditor in possession
of collateral only has conditional right to sell collateral after debtor's default).
210. See Stuart v. American Sec. Bank, 494 A.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C. 1985) (explaining
caveat emptor applies to foreclosure sales because selling creditor is known to be
transferring debtor's interest, thus has no duty to investigate and disclose potential
outstanding claims); Cohn v. Amidown, 24 N.E. 944, 944 (N.Y. 1890) (holding no
warranty of title existed where circumstances clear that seller only conveying limited
interest); see also U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (providing that the warranty of title is excluded or
modified when buyer knows seller "does not claim title in himself').
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approach similar to that found in Article 2A. These courts permitted
recovery by foreclosure sale purchasers where title to the good sold
did not pass because of the selling lienholder's conduct. Early this
century, the Minnesota Supreme Court permitted recovery under a
warranty theory when a lienholder sold a team of horses under an
invalid mortgage.2 " The Court distinguished between warranting title
against preexisting claims and encumbrances and warranting that the
sale was conducted under a valid mortgage. - 2 While the Court found
that the seller made no warranty as to the former, the seller at least
warranted the right to sell exists. 213
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached a similar result
in Basiliko v. Pargo Corp.214 In this case, the debtor had cured its
default prior to the foreclosure sale, however the lienholder, unaware
of the cure, conducted the sale anyway. 15 When the lienholder re-
fused to conclude the sale after learning of the cure, the purchaser
sued to recover damages for breach of contract.216 The court permit-
ted the purchaser to recover because the failure to convey good title
was a result of the seller's wrongful conduct in proceeding with the
sale. 17 The court stated "the rule of caveat emptor can provide no
basis for exempting the foreclosure sale vendor from the usual obliga-
tion that 'a vendor is bound to know that he can deliver that which he
professes to sell.' ",218 The court found that liability on the seller was
justified in that to do otherwise would place the burden of seller's
mistake on the purchaser.2 1 9 Both of these courts, while recognizing
the general rule that there is no warranty of title in foreclosure ac-
tions, were willing to impose liability on the seller when its failure to
convey title to the foreclosure purchaser was due to the actions of the
seller. Both cases provide a more reasoned approach to the warran-
ties a selling secured party should give its purchaser than that cur-
rently proposed for inclusion in 9-504.
Under this type of approach, the selling secured party would not
only warrant its right to sell as in Basiliko and Bogestad, but also that
it has not done anything to give rise to a superior claim to the collat-
eral. Additionally, because the warranty would extend to claims
caused by an omission of the transferor, any superior interest which
211. Bogestad v. Anderson, 173 N.W. 674, 675 (Minn. 1919).
212. Id.
213. I.
214. 532 A.2d 1346 (D.C. 1987).
215. Id. at 1347.
216. d. at 1347-50.
217. Id- at 1349-50.
218. Id (quoting Trans World Airlines v. Skyline Air Parts, Inc., 193 A.2d 72, 75
(D.C. 1963)).
219. Il For a further discussion of the Bogestad and Basiliko cases, see Meadows,
supra note 2, at 198-200.
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would survive the sale and was known to the selling secured party
would also be covered under the warranty.
C. Consistent Solutions
Purchasers at foreclosure sales need some protection from receiving
goods with little value, however sellers at these sales are doing so in-
voluntarily and should not be saddled with the burdens of trying to
ascertain the validity of debtor's title. Requiring sellers to warrant
their own actions, but not that of the debtor or its predecessors-in-
title, strikes such a balance.
An approach similar to that found in Article 2A and used by the
courts in Bogestad and Basiliko balances the interests of the parties
involved. With respect to title defects caused by its own acts or omis-
sions, the seller has superior knowledge and the ability to cure these
deficiencies. The risk of these defects, therefore, should fall on the
seller.22 0 The seller, however, does not have superior.knowledge or
ability to prevent loss where the claim against the collateral preexisted
the seller's interest. The seller is in no better position than the pur-
chaser. In light of the relatively low amount paid in a typical foreclo-
sure sale, there appears to be no reason to shift the risk to the seller
from where it currently resides, with the purchaser,22' who is generally
acquiring property at less than market value. Each party to the sale
assumes some risk, commensurate with its position and the advan-
tages the sale provides to it.
The issue of warranties and foreclosure sales can be resolved in a
number of ways which are not inconsistent with the policies of the
Code. The Code can balance the interests of all three parties in-
volved, requiring each to act diligently and placing the loss on the
party who does not, as I suggested in my earlier article. It can adopt a
more limited approach, similar to that adopted for leases in Article
2A and the Bogestad and Basiliko cases, leaving the debtor's interests
unaltered, but providing purchasers with protection from defects in
title caused by the wrongful acts of the seller. Either of these will
avoid the problems inherent in the revision currently under
consideration.
These approaches, which limit a creditor's liability to claims caused
by its own acts or omissions, would not be plagued by the problems
and potential challenges, to which the approach found in the current
proposed revisions. If the secured creditor only warrants its own ac-
tions, the incentive to disclaim, limiting unknown and unpredictable
liability, will not be present. The creditor will not have the need to
220. See Menachem Mautner, "The Eternal Triangles of the Law". Toward a The-
ory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 95, 104 (1991)(suggesting that in a situation where one party who can avoid loss, the other should be
protected).
221. See generally discussion supra part II.A.
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disclaim the warranty because its potential liability is circumscribed
and within its control. Without the incentive to disclaim, a reasonable
creditor will not disclaim, thus taking away a potential challenge to
the reasonableness of the sale. Depriving a creditor of the right to
disclaim in order to protect the debtor and the reasonableness of the
sale will also not be unjust. The creditor is only guaranteeing that
there is no claim against the title which it caused; it is not subject to
the greater liability of a voluntary seller under Article 2. Taking away
this issue as a potential area of dispute between creditor and debtor
will promote certainty and predictability in foreclosure sales, consis-
tent with the goals of Article 9.
Similarly, junior creditors will not be exposed to large potential
claims unless their act or omission resulted in the claim against the
title which caused the purchaser's loss. This should permit junior
creditors to reap the benefits of the proposed revision, which will
make clear their entitlement to proceeds even as against senior se-
cured parties. Article 9 will not take away with the prefatory language
in section 9-504(1) what section 9-504(l)(e) will give. Creditors are
clearly better off with this more limited approach.
Purchasers will be protected against the wrongful acts of the credi-
tor. The lack of protection of foreclosure purchasers from claims aris-
ing from the acts of the creditor is the most inequitable aspect of
current law. These approaches solve this most egregious omission
from Article 9. Additionally, the risk of a defect in or lien against the
debtor's title remains with the purchaser. Purchasers, therefore, will
still have the incentive to inquire as to the state of the debtor's title
and potential claims against it, but will be protected against poten-
tially hidden claims caused by the selling secured party, which would
be difficult for purchasers to discover. Purchasers are better off than
under current law. Furthermore, the purchaser's power to avoid the
loss coupled with the protection against the creditor's actions should
encourage higher prices at foreclosure sales, a definite benefit to
debtors.
Overall transaction costs will be minimized. In every transaction,
the secured creditor will not have the need to do an exhaustive search
as to the debtor's title, beyond that which it would be likely to conduct
under current law. Only when there is a default and resale of the
collateral will a search as to the state of the debtor's title by the pur-
chaser be warranted. Unnecessary searches by the creditor in each
and every secured transaction will be avoided, thus reducing costs to
debtors as a group.
Secured transactions will also be subject to less risk under this ap-
proach. Creditors will only warrant their own actions. Thus a creditor
who acts reasonably and in good faith will have little to fear under
these proposals. The risk to the creditor will be little more than the
risk currently present in secured lending. This reduction in risk also
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benefits debtors by making lending more available and less expensive.
These are consistent with the Code goals of simplicity, certainty and
cost-effectiveness.
Both approaches balance the needs of the purchaser and the credi-
tor. The creditor is in the best position to prevent defects caused by
its actions, but cannot do so with respect to past defects. The pur-
chaser is given protection from claims caused by the seller's actions,
but more limited protection, in recognition of the smaller purchaser
price paid at a foreclosure sale. The transaction will be more certain
because the seller must insure that transfer to the purchaser is rightful
and potential challenges to the validity of the sale on the part of the
debtor should be minimized. Transaction costs over all will be mini-
mized, while purchasers will be protected from wrongful actions of the
secured creditor. A proper balance will be stuck.
Perhaps more important than the adoption of one particular ap-
proach is the need for the drafters to carefully consider the problem a
Code revision is designed to address in light of the purposes and poli-
cies of the Code and all the ramifications of any proposed change. 22
Such an approach should result in a narrowly tailored solution to the
actual problem and avoid unnecessary time and expense involved in
litigating unresolved issues. While an expectation that the drafters
can consider every ramification of each proposed change may be un-
realistic, the result, if they do not, will be with the commercial world
well into the next century.3
222. See Gedid, supra note 174, at 372 (suggesting Karl Lleweilyn, principal drafter
of the Code "consciously included reason, purpose, and policy" in drafting the
U.C.C.); Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 325, 333
(1995) (noting that Llewellyn's jurisprudence which influenced the U.C.C. was to set
goals, enact law to reach goals, then monitor its success).
223. The last major revision of Article 9 occurred over two decades ago in 1972.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 116, at 596. It is reasonable to expect that the next
revision will have similar longevity.
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